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Abstract
This dissertation studies game theoretical models for political competition and a class of
coordination games, it also includes a chapter focusing on estimation of the U.S. legislators’
ideal points in multiple meaningful dimensions.
The first chapter presents a formal political competition model with differentiated can-
didates. In this model, the government expenditure must be financed through a propor-
tional income tax, candidates in an electoral competition are exogenously differentiated in
how to allocate tax revenue on two public goods when elected but still are able to pro-
pose different tax policy to compete for voters. Citizen voters also have different trade-offs
between the two public goods. In equilibrium, both candidates compete for support from
a common cut-off voter type, who is indifferent between the two candidates and in gen-
eral is not the expected median voter. All other voter types have strict preference over
exact one of the two candidates. Conditions are characterized under which policy conver-
gence and divergence may emerge respectively in equilibrium. From a welfare perspective,
the equilibrium policies are not ex-ante majority efficient. The model also predicts that
more extremeness in spending government revenue on one public good is detrimental for
candidates.
The second chapter examines sequential coordination games where players can decide
whether to join in an adventure and when to join in. A player opting to delay is able to
observe his opponent’s action before him. The first mover has a privilege to claim more
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share of benefit from the adventure but do so at his own peril, in the sense that if the
other player does not follow him to join in, an extra cost will be imposed. It studies how
the introduction of endogenous timing and reward for the first mover affects coordination
games with asymmetric information. An equilibrium in the form of monotone strategy
with symmetric cutoffs exists. It also shows that harsher punishment can suppress a
player’s incentive to move first, but give rise to more follow-up from the other player.
Similarly, more reward for the first mover leads to higher probability of moving first, but
less follow-up. As private signals become infinitely informative, endogenous timing has
positive welfare improvement on coordination with asymmetric information. Numerical
analysis demonstrates that endogenous timing and the increasing of reward for the first
mover can effectively help coordination.
The third chapter proposes a novel topic-factorized ideal point estimation model for a
legislative voting network extracted from the U.S. Congress roll call voting data. Tradi-
tional ideal point models, either one-dimensional or multi-dimensional, do not give explicit
meaning to the latent policy space. Utilizing the text information contained in bills, a uni-
fied model that combines voting behavior modeling and topic modeling is presented, which
directly estimates the ideal points of legislators and bills for multiple meaningful dimen-
sions. Besides, the generation of topics are guided by the voting records in addition to the
bill texts. An iterative estimation strategy is proposed to learn the topics of bills as well
as the topic-factorized ideal points of legislators and bills. By comparing with the state-
of-the-art ideal point estimation models, the new method has a much better explanation
power in terms of held-out log-likelihood and other measures.
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Chapter 1
Taxation and Public Expenditure
in A Differentiated Candidates
Framework
1.1 Introduction
In the classical Downsian model, a candidate’s policy space is often a set of income tax
rates. Citizen voters have preferences over private consumption, and a public good which
is compensated by tax revenue (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2002)). The well-known
result is that, in equilibrium, both candidates propose the same tax rate which is the ideal
point of the median voter. Voters usually differ in their income, or in their trade-offs
between private and public consumption.
Elected Candidates in fact spend tax revenue on many different public goods or pro-
grams when in office, and there is a well-perceived notion in the general public that
Democrats and Republicans spend government revenue in different ways. For example,
compared with Republicans, Democrats tend to spend more on health care, education or
other social programs, while Republicans tend to spend more than Democrats on defense
or other public security issues. From 1929 to 2012, out of the total federal government
expenditure, Republicans spent on average about 72.2 percent on defense per year, while
Democrats spent about 67.5 percent on defense per year; if we ignore the years between
1942 and 1945 (when the U.S. was involved in the World War II and a Democratic pres-
ident was in office), Democrats spent about 64.5 percent on defense per year.1 However,
1Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. Department of Commerce.
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when “government spending” is raised as an issue in electoral competition, the particu-
lar structure of the spending is often left unspecified. The public rhetoric articulated by
political candidates frequently prevents citizen voters from “picking and choosing” among
different programs (Jacoby (1994)). One possible explanation is that, in such electoral
competition, candidates can only credibly commit the level of taxation (which implies the
level of government spending) they will impose when in office but not the way how they will
spend the revenue collected. The way how political candidates spend government revenue
on different public goods or programs may be constrained by their parties, interest groups
or their own backgrounds and preferences.
In this paper, we present a formal political competition model in which two office-
motivated candidates are exogenously differentiated in how they will spend government
revenue on two public goods if elected, yet still are able to propose any tax rate as their
policy platform in order to win the election. In particular, we assume that given any level of
taxation (and the implied total government expenditure), one candidate (e.g., Democrats)
will allocate more share of tax revenue on a social good (e.g., health care, education or
social security), while the other one (e.g., Republicans) will allocate more on a security
good (e.g., public security or defense).2 Voters have preferences over private consumption
and two public goods. Citizen voters differ in their trade-offs between the two public goods,
some voters care more about social program, while others care more about security pro-
gram. Though the policy space is one dimension, the level of taxation indeed determines
all three relevant components entering voter’s utility by interacting with candidates’ fixed
characteristics (i.e., their allocation rules for the tax revenue), including private consump-
tion (measured by after-tax income), and the amounts of two public goods (measured by
2Here “allocate more” on some program is only relative to a candidate’s opponent, this does not
necessarily mean that a candidate allocates more than half share of tax revenue on his preferred program.
For example, it might be the case that a Democratic candidate allocates 2/3 tax revenue on defense, while
a Republican candidate allocates 3/4 on defense.
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the amount of money allocated). Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter
types when they propose their tax rates in the electoral competition stage.
Our first result shows that in any equilibrium, two candidates propose their respective
tax rates to maximize a common cut-off voter’s utility. This is similar to the classical
Downsian model where two candidates maximize the median voter’s utility. However,
the cut-off voter in our model in general (with probability 1) is not the median voter
(or median median voter when the distribution of voter types is uncertain). And, in the
classical Downsian model or citizen-candidate model, in equilibrium all voters including the
median voter are indifferent between the two candidates because their convergent tax rate
or same distance of their policy positions relative to the median voter’s ideal position, but
in our model only the cut-off voter is indifferent, all other voters have strict preference over
exact one of the two candidates. Indeed, voters who put more weight on social program
will support the candidate who allocates more share of tax revenue on social program
(Democrats), voters who put more weight on security program will support the candidate
who allocates more on security program (Republicans). This result does not depend on
whether we have convergent or divergent tax rates in equilibrium.
Then we explore the conditions under which policy convergence or divergence may
emerge in equilibrium. If voter preferences over two public goods are homothetic, then
in equilibrium both candidates propose the same tax rate. Since Democratic candidate
allocates more on social program, and Republican candidate allocates more on security
program, it’s clear that in equilibrium Democrats offer more social good, Republicans offer
more security good. The reason is that in this case, both the advantage and disadvantage
of two candidates do not change over tax rates, there is a voter type who is indifferent
between the two candidates as long as they propose the same tax rate, and this voter type
is determined solely on how the two candidates allocate their tax revenue. It turns out that
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this is the cut-off voter in equilibrium, so both candidates can maximize this voter’s utility
by the same tax rate. Indeed, homothetic preference implies the uniform candidate ranking
(UCR) property in Krasa and Polborn (2012), that is, all voters’ preferred candidate does
not change with tax rates if the two candidates propose the same one.
When voter preferences demonstrate a strict single crossing property (SSCP), we have
policy divergence in equilibrium. Analogous to the UCR property, the SSCP says that
even if the two candidates propose the same tax rate, a voter’s preferred candidate would
change with tax rates and change permanently (e.g., from “prefer candidate 0 to 1” to
“prefer candidate 1 to 0”, or vice versa) at some point. The idea is that in this case, at
a relatively low tax rate, voters may prefer the candidate who allocates more on security
program because security is a kind of necessity, but as tax rate increases, voters eventually
becomes strictly prefer the candidate who allocates more on social program because its
higher substitutability with private consumption at high tax rate.
All these results are independent with the distribution of voter preferences, the same
result as in Krasa and Polborn (2010a), different with the classical Downsian model and
the citizen-candidate model (Besley and Coate (1997), Osborne and Slivinski (1996)) where
both the type of cut-off voter (i.e., the median or median median voter) and policy platform
in equilibrium are dependent upon the particular distribution of voter preferences. But the
winning probabilities of candidates do change with the distribution, while in the Downsian
and citizen-candidate model, a candidate always wins with a half probability.
The median voter is still decisive for the electoral result in our model in the sense that
a candidate can only win the election if the realized median voter is closer to him, that
is, the realized median voter strictly prefers him to his opponent. As a result, ex-post, a
majority of voters would prefer the winning candidate to implement a different tax rate
than what he has proposed in his campaign. However, the direction of change that a
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majority of voters strictly prefer is not determinant, which is based on the comparison of
marginal returns between too public goods. For example, suppose a Democratic candidate
wins the election (implying that a majority of voters care more about the social good)
with proposed tax rate t∗, then a majority of voters would prefer the winning candidate
to implement a higher tax rate if the marginal return from social good is higher than the
marginal return from security good at t∗. Finally, we also show that it is detrimental to
a candidate’s winning probability if a candidate increases further the share of tax revenue
he allocates to his preferred program, i.e., more extremeness is no good.
Osborne (1995) and Grofman (2004) provide excellent reviews of the literature focusing
on the policy convergence or divergence in one-dimensional candidate competition models,
out of which policy divergence often comes from policy-motivated candidates (e.g, Wittman
(1983), Calvert (1985), Roemer (1994), Martinelli (2001)) or incomplete information (e.g.,
Callander (2008), Bernhardt et al. (2009)). The classical Downsian model, candidates with
valence (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Groseclose (2001, 2007)), and probabilistic
voting models (e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993), Coughlin (1992), Banks and Dug-
gan (2005)) get policy convergence in equilibrium. In the valence and probabilistic voting
models, voters have preferences over candidates’ fixed characteristics and a flexible policy
dimension, as in our model. But in these models candidates’ fixed characteristics enter vot-
er’s utility in an additively separable way, so as Krasa and Polborn (2012) points out, UCR
property can be easily satisfied, which is the fundamental reason for policy convergence in
these models.
Our model follows the general differentiated candidates framework developed in Krasa
and Polborn (2010a,b, 2012, 2013), in which voters’ utilities are dependent upon candidates’
exogenously fixed characteristics and a flexible policy dimension that candidates can choose
to maximize their winning probabilities, but not necessarily entering voter’s utility in an
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additively separable way as in the valence and probabilistic voting models. Krasa and
Polborn (2012) characterize a class of uniform candidate ranking (UCR) voter preferences
which generically give rise to policy convergence in equilibrium. But if candidates’ fixed
characteristics and the flexible policy interact with each other such that a voter’s preferred
candidate changes with the policy (assuming two candidates propose the same policy), then
the UCR property would fail and then a divergent policy equilibrium possibly emerges.
However, Krasa and Polborn (2012) does not give a sufficient condition that guarantees a
divergent policy equilibrium. In this paper, we present a sufficient condition analogous to
the UCR property.
Krasa and Polborn (2010a), Krasa and Polborn (2013) are two applications of this
framework. In Krasa and Polborn (2010a), voters have preferences over two public goods,
some voters care more about one public good while others care more about the other one.
Two candidates compete with each other by proposing how to allocate the same tax revenue
between two public goods, but they have different advantages in producing the two goods.
In equilibrium, a candidate allocates more resource to the public good for which he has
higher productivity than his competitor. Instead, the model in this paper assumes that
candidates’ allocation rules over two public goods are exogenously fixed, and we go back
to ask whether they will propose the same or different tax rates as their platform, voters
in our model also get utility from private consumption.
In Krasa and Polborn (2013), two candidates differ in their fixed ideology position
and choose a tax rate and implied government spending to maximize their vote share.
Difference with the probabilistic voting model is that two candidates’ abilities to implement
any economic policy are not the same. In equilibrium, candidates choose different tax
rates to cater to a mix of swing voters. The paper focuses on how the ideological and
economic preferences of the electorate influence candidates’ choices of tax rate and implied
6
government spending. Our model examines how voter preferences over two public goods
determine the equilibrium tax rate and implied government spending.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In next Section 1.2, we introduce
the model with discussion about candidates’ exogenously differentiated characteristics. We
characterize the equilibrium result in Section 1.3 and then in Section 1.4 we explore the
conditions under which policy convergence and divergence may emerge respectively in
equilibrium, followed by Section 1.5, discussion of welfare implication and comparative
statics. Concluding remarks will be in the last Section 1.6.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 The setup
Consider an election with two candidates, j = 0, 1, and a continuum of voters. Individual
voters have preferences over private consumption, c, and two public goods, x0 and x1. A
voter’s type is given by θ ∈ [0, 1], which parameterizes voter preferences over two public
goods, with high types putting more weight on good 0 and low types putting more weight
on good 1. In particular, for a generic voter type θ, her utility function is uθ(c, x0, x1) =
c+θv0(x0)+(1−θ)v1(x1), where v0(·), v1(·) are strictly increasing and strictly concave, and
are not necessarily the same. For notation simplicity, henceforth we will write v(x0, x1, θ) =
θv0(x0) + (1− θ)v1(x1).
There is uncertainty about the distribution of θ, which is determined by a parameterized
cumulative distribution function Ψm(θ). We define θm as the median voter type [i.e.,
Ψm(θm) = 0.5], which is revealed only after the election, so θm is a random variable. The
median voter type is decisive for the election outcome in our model in the sense that winning
θm implies winning the election, since winning θm means a candidate receives more than
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a half vote share in the election. But later we will show that in general (with probability
1) θm is not the cut-off voter who is indifferent between the two candidates in equilibrium.
Actually, θm does not enter directly into a candidate’s decision making process at all, even
if the uncertainty about θm disappears.
Two candidates, j = 0, 1, compete in the election. A winning candidate provides two
public goods, x0 and x1, compensated by a proportional income tax levied on all voters.
We assume all voters have the same income and normalize it equal to 1, so for a tax rate
tj , tax revenue is tj , the after-tax private consumption c will be 1− tj .3 Candidate j then
allocates tax revenue tj to two public goods. We assume two candidates are exogenously
differentiated in how to allocate the tax revenue to two public goods when in office. Specif-
ically, candidate 0 allocates fraction α0 of tax revenue t0 to public good 0 (and so a fraction
1 − α0 of tax revenue is allocated to public good 1), candidate 1 allocates fraction α1 of
tax revenue t1 to public good 0 (and so a fraction 1 − α1 of tax revenue is allocated to
public good 1). We assume αj ∈ (0, 1), to avoid the uninteresting cases where candidates
put all tax revenue into one public good. So if candidate j wins the election, he provides
the following amount of two public goods:

xj0 = α
jtj ,
xj1 = (1− αj)tj .
Without loss of generality, we assume α0 > α1, so compared with his competitor, candidate
0 (e.g., Democrats) allocates higher fraction of tax revenue to good 0 (e.g., social programs
including health care and/or education), candidate 1 (e.g., Republicans) allocates higher
fraction of tax revenue to good 1 (e.g., security-related programs including defense and/or
public security).
3So a voter’s utility is quasi-linear in after-tax income.
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Candidates are assumed to be office-motivated, receiving utility 1 if elected, and u-
tility 0 otherwise. Candidates have general von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions,
so their objectives are maximizing winning probability. Because of uncertainty about the
distribution of θ, this is equivalent to vote share maximization. Since αj is exogenously
determined, the policy platform is one dimensional in our model, which is the tax rate, tj .
All the three components entering voters’ utility functions, including private consumption
and the amounts of two public goods, are determined by the level of taxation.
The timing of the game is following. First, candidates (simultaneously) announce their
policy platform, tj ∈ [0, 1]; then citizens vote for their preferred candidates, or abstain
when indifferent between the two candidates (or we can assume that they will randomly
vote for each of the two candidates with equal probability); θm is realized, the candidate
with more vote share than his opponent wins the election, executes the tax rate he has
proposed and provides the implied amounts of two public goods. In case of a tie between
the two candidates, each candidate wins with probability a half by a lottery.
1.2.2 Discussion of the model
A key innovation of our model is that candidates are exogenously differentiated in how they
will spend the government revenue when in office, but still are able to propose their tax
policy to attract voters. Note first that if candidates could also credibly commit their tax
revenue allocation before the election, then their policy platform becomes two dimensional,
defined by (tj , αj). In this case, it’s not difficult to see that there exists an equilibrium
in which both candidates propose the same tax rate and the same allocation rule, so we
have policy convergence, and each candidate wins the election with probability a half in
the equilibrium. Indeed, both candidates will choose the bliss point of the median median
voter (i.e., the median of θm) as policy platform. It’s also clear that if the two candidates
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were identical in how they will spend the government revenue, then we have an equilibrium
in which both candidates propose the same tax rate maximizing the utility of the median
median voter, we also have policy convergence. In both cases, the model will be very close
to the standard Downsian model.
We can interpret the differentiation in candidates’ revenue allocation rules in several
different ways. First, candidates may be constrained by their political parties with re-
spect to how they can spend the government revenue. There is a widespread notion that
Democrats and Republicans spend the government revenue in different ways. For example,
Republicans tend to spend more money on military or other security-related programs,
and Democrats tend to spend more money on health care, education or other social pro-
grams (Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), McCarty and Rosenthal (2006), Fellowes and Rowe
(2004)). There are also evidences across countries that leftist party control of government
leads to more social spending (Blais et al. (1993, 1996)). The parties may influence on
what allocation rules their candidates can make when in office. In the United States, the
two-stage electoral process may create an important centrifugal force if we posit that the
policy platform that a candidate claims in the primary is the one he is stuck with in the
general election (Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985)). Our model will fit in the case where
electorates in the primary care about how the government revenue should be spent but not
the level of taxation imposed on the whole society.
Second, candidates may be influenced by interest groups through campaign financing.
As rewards, a candidate, when in office, may allocate more resources to those groups who
have contributed more money in his campaign. There is evidence that the composition
of government spending often leads to significant shifts in demand across sectors (Ramey
and Shapiro (1999)). Recent study finds that using a new measure of industry exposure
to government spending, variation in firms’ performance can be predictable by presidential
10
partisan cycles through the government spending channel (Belo et al. (2013)).
Interest groups also influence the way a candidate allocates its resources through par-
ties, so this effect intertwines together with the effect of the first kind. Some scholars
find no robust evidence that government spending depends on the partisan makeup of the
legislature (Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001)). But the important thing is how the citizen
voters perceive the difference in composition of spending between Democrats and Repub-
licans. As long as there is perceived differentiation among voters in how Democrats and
Republicans will allocate the tax revenue, candidates will not be able to credibly commit
their allocation rules, which is what our model captures.
Third, candidates may have their own preferences on two public goods. That is to say,
candidates are policy-motivated regarding to how tax revenue should be allocated on two
public goods. For example, if both candidates have homothetic preferences with different
trade-offs over two public goods, then conditional on any tax revenue, they will allocate
constant yet different fractions of tax revenue on good 0 and good 1.
Fourth, we may interpret the differentiation between α0 and α1 coming from candi-
dates’ different productivity in producing two public goods (e.g., as in Krasa and Polborn
(2010a)). We can treat αj as production technology itself, so for the same resource, can-
didate 0 produces more good 0 while candidate 1 produces more good 1. But we can also
interpret αj as an effective allocation rule resulting from candidates’ differentiation in pro-
ductivity. In Krasa and Polborn (2010a), a candidate proposes to spend more money on
the public good for which he has advantage. In our model, we don’t consider candidates’
specialization in producing public goods, but we can think of αj as the effective fraction
of resource allocated to good 0, resulting from candidates’ specialized productivity but
absorbing the effects from different productivity already.
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1.3 Equilibrium characterization
We characterize the equilibrium first, then in the next section we will explore the conditions
under which policy convergence and divergence emerge in equilibrium, respectively.
For any pair of policy platform (t0, t1), a voter θ (weakly) prefers candidate 0 over
candidate 1 if and only if
1− t0 + v(x00, x01, θ) ≥ 1− t1 + v(x10, x11, θ). (1.1)
A voter is indifferent between the two candidates if and only if the equality holds. Lemma
A.1 (in Appendix) shows that for any pair of policy platform (t0, t1), there is a cut-off
voter type θ(t0, t1) ∈ (0, 1) who is indifferent between the two candidates,4 unless all voters
(weakly) prefer the same candidate. In Proposition 1.1, we show that in equilibrium,
candidate 0 offers more amount of good 0 while less amount of good 1 than candidate 1,
that is, x00 > x
1
0 and x
0
1 < x
1
1. In such case, there exists a cut-off voter type θ¯ who is
indifferent between the two candidates, and higher voter types θ > θ¯ will strictly prefer
candidate 0, lower voter types θ < θ¯ will strictly prefer candidate 1.
Graphically, the indifference circle for a voter type θ in the (x0, x1) space is like one of
those in the left panel of Figure 1.1. We say bθ is the bliss point of voter θ, where the voter’s
utility is maximized by a tax rate tθ together with an allocation rule (αθ, 1 − αθ). A tax
rate is represented by a budget line in the figure (the one with negative slope); tan θ, i.e.,
the ratio 1−αθαθ , represents the allocation rule. Given any voter type θ, a bigger indifference
circle corresponds to lower level of utility while a smaller indifference circle means higher
utility level for θ. For a higher voter type (higher θ), her indifference circle will move toward
lower-right, while for a lower voter type (lower θ), her indifference circle will move toward
4Here we use the dependent form θ(t0, t1) since the indifferent voter type is a function of (t0, t1), by θ¯
only we mean the cut-off voter in equilibrium.
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upper-left. We add candidates’ expansion lines (represent candidates’ allocation rules) in
the right panel of Figure 1.1. Now given policy platform (t0, t1) and implied amount of
public goods, (x00, x
0
1) offered by candidate 0, (x
1
0, x
1
1) offered by candidate 1, we can easily
get a cut-off voter type θ(t0, t1) who is indifferent between the two candidates.5
b?
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x
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Indifference cirle
for higher ?
Indifference cirle
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tan?
(a) Indifference circles with different θ
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0
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0
1
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(x
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0
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1'
1
)
(x
0'
0
,x
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1
)
(b) Indifferent voter type θ(t0, t1)
Figure 1.1: Indifference circles and indifferent voter
We first argue that in any equilibrium, the bliss point of the cut-off voter θ¯, must be
located between the expansion lines of the two candidates. This is illustrated in the left
panel of Figure 1.2. It is easy to see that bθ¯ cannot be located to the left of the expansion
line of candidate 1. If on the contrary that bθ¯ is to the left of the expansion line α
1, then the
tax rate t0 is the optimal that candidate 0 can choose to maximize θ¯’s utility. However, it’s
clear that candidate 1 can easily beat candidate 0 by a large range of t1, that is, candidate
1 can choose any t1 ∈ (t′, t′′) to have θ¯ vote for him. So bθ¯ cannot be to the left of line α1.
Similarly, bθ¯ cannot be to the right of line α
0.
Now suppose θ¯ is a voter type whose bliss point is located between the two expansion
5Note that θ(t0, t1) is also indifferent if the two candidates choose the pair (t0′, t1′) (or (t0, t1′), (t0′, t1))
as their platform.
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bθ¯
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(b) Voter type between α0 and α1
Figure 1.2: Bliss point of the cut-off voter θ¯
lines α0 and α1, as in the right panel of Figure 1.2. Note that with the pair (t0, t1), θ¯ is
indifferent between the two candidates. However, the tax rate choice of candidate 0 does
not maximize θ¯’s utility, candidate 0 can maximize θ¯’s utility by choosing a different tax
rate t0′, similarly, candidate 1 can also maximize θ¯’s utility by choosing another tax rate
t1′. Since this is a zero-sum game, at least one of the two candidates will get a strictly
higher winning probability by unilaterally deviating from (t0, t1). So it’s clear that the
pair (t0, t1) can not be the equilibrium policy platform, and θ¯ cannot be the cut-off voter
type in equilibrium, because candidate 1 can offer higher level of utility for this voter
than candidate 0 when both candidates try to maximize her utility. In equilibrium, it
must be that both candidates’ choices are the tangent points of their expansion lines to
the indifference circle of θ¯, the cut-off voter type in equilibrium, as in Figure 1.3. In this
equilibrium, θ¯ is the cut-off voter who is indifferent between the two candidates, and neither
candidate can increase θ¯’s utility by changing tax rate.6 Because v(x0, x1, θ) is separable
6In the left panel of Figure 1.3, t0 and t1 are on the same budget line, so t0 = t1, we have convergent
policy equilibrium; in the right panel of Figure 1.3, t0 and t1 are on different budget lines, t0 6= t1, we
have divergent policy equilibrium. We will explore the conditions which lead to policy convergence and
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between x0 and x1, at the tangent points, further increasing of x
0
0 leads to a lower level
utility for θ¯, while further increasing of x10 leads to a higher level utility for θ¯, so we have
∂u(·)
∂x00
< 0 and ∂u(·)
∂x10
> 0, which implies ∂v(·)
∂x00
< 1 < ∂v(·)
∂x10
. By strict concavity of v(x0, x1, θ),
we have x00 > x
1
0 in equilibrium. Similarly, we can get x
0
1 < x
1
1 in equilibrium. In this case,
the denominator of the following equation (see Equation A.4 in Appendix) is positive:
θ =
t0 − t1 + v1(x11)− v1(x01)
v0(x00)− v0(x10) + v1(x11)− v1(x01)
. (1.2)
So for voters with higher types (θ > θ¯), they will vote for candidate 0, for voters with lower
types (θ < θ¯), they will vote for candidate 1.
x0
x
1
α1
α0bθ¯
t0
t1
(a) Equilibrium with t0 and t1 the same
x0
x
1
α1
α0
bθ¯t
1
t0
(b) Equilibrium with different t0 and t1
Figure 1.3: Tax rates and cut-off voter in equilibrium
The results are summarized in Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1. If a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, then it is given by the solution
divergence in equilibrium respectively later in the paper.
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(t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) of the following system of equations:
∂v(x00, x
0
1, θ¯)
∂x00
α0 +
∂v(x00, x
0
1, θ¯)
∂x01
(1− α0) = 1 (1.3)
∂v(x10, x
1
1, θ¯)
∂x10
α1 +
∂v(x10, x
1
1, θ¯)
∂x11
(1− α1) = 1 (1.4)
1− t¯0 + v(x00, x01, θ¯) = 1− t¯1 + v(x10, x11, θ¯) (1.5)
The policy platform of the two candidates are t¯0 and t¯1, θ¯ is the type of the cut-off voter
who is indifferent between the two candidates, for all voters with θ > θ¯, they will vote for
candidate 0, for all voters with θ < θ¯, they will vote for candidate 1.
The meaning of the equations in Proposition 1.1 are straightforward. The first two
equations indicate that both candidates choose their optimal tax policy to maximize a
common voter type θ¯’s utility, so that voter θ¯’s indifference circle is tangent to the two
candidates’ expansion lines at t¯0 and t¯1 respectively. The left hand side of each of the
two equations is the combined marginal benefit of public goods consumption from tax
rate increasing at t¯j , which should be equal to 1, the unchanged marginal loss of private
consumption from tax rate increasing. The last equation specifies the cut-off voter type θ¯,
who is indifferent between the two candidates. Because α0, α1 ∈ (0, 1), we have θ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
in equilibrium, so for all voters with θ 6= θ¯, they must have strict preference over exact
one of the two candidates. Since in equilibrium candidate 0 offers more amount of good
0 while candidate 1 offers more amount of good 1, it is natural to think that the higher
voter types who put more weight on good 0 will vote for candidate 0 and the lower voter
types will vote for candidate 1.
Because the strict concavity of v(·), the second order conditions can be easily checked.
16
So a triple (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) satisfying Equation 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 is at least a local equilibrium.
To see this, we draw Figure 1.3 again as Figure 1.4(a). Recall that in equilibrium, we
have x00 > x
1
0 and x
0
1 < x
1
1. From Figure 1.4(a) we can see that for a large range of tax
rates around t¯0 (from t0
′
to t0
′′
), candidate 0 still offers more good 0 but less good 1 than
candidate 1, so the denominator of Equation 1.2 is still positive. As a result, if candidate
0 changes to another tax rate t ∈ (t0′ , t0′′ ), he will lose the support from the cut-off voter
θ¯, he still get support from higher types but the new cut-off voter type will be greater
than θ¯, his winning probability will strictly decrease. Similar argument can be applied for
candidate 1, so (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) is a local equilibrium.
Whether (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) is a global equilibrium depends on whether a candidate can attract
support from the voters who vote for his opponent by a large deviation. We can not exclude
this possibility without imposing extra conditions. The right panel of Figure 1.4 depicts
such deviation by candidate 0. In the equilibrium of (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯), voters with θ > θ¯ support
candidate 0. However, if candidate 0 deviates to t0
′
, he maximizes the utility of θ = 0 such
that θ = 0 strictly prefers candidate 0 to candidate 1 after the deviation. By Lemma A.1 (in
Appendix), now the set of voters who support candidate 0 becomes [0, θ′] with θ′ < θ¯. Then
candidate 0’s winning probability becomes Ψm(θ
′), while candidate 1’s winning probability
becomes 1 − Ψm(θ′). In the (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) configuration, candidate 0’s winning probability is
1 − Ψm(θ¯), candidate 1’s winning probability is Ψm(θ¯). So if Ψm(θ′) < 1 − Ψm(θ¯), then
candidate 0 would not deviate. Because θ′ < θ¯, we have Ψm(θ′) < Ψm(θ¯), when both
candidate’s winning probabilities are close enough to 1/2 in the (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) configuration,
then a global equilibrium may exist, a similar result as in Krasa and Polborn (2010a).
If deviation of candidate 0 can never help him win the support from θ = 0, then
it is always detrimental for him to deviate from t¯0, which in turn guarantees a global
equilibrium. The reason is that, after deviation, voter θ¯ will strictly prefer candidate 1,
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so the set of voters who support candidate 0 can not be [0, 1]; then by Lemma A.1 (in
Appendix), either θ = 0 or θ = 1 is the endpoint of the set of voters who support candidate
0. If candidate 0 can not win θ = 0 from deviation, then he still win supports from higher
voter types but the new cut-off voter will be some θ′ > θ¯, his winning probability strictly
decreases.
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α1
α0
bθ¯t
1
t0
t0’
t0’’
(a) (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) as a local equilibrium
x
0
x
1
0
bθ¯
t
1
t
0
t
0’
α
1
Indifference circle of θ=0
(b) A large deviation by candidate 0
Figure 1.4: Deviation by candidate 0
1.4 Policy convergence and divergence
A reader may have noticed that we haven’t discussed any relationship between t¯0 and t¯1
in Proposition 1.1, that is, t¯0 and t¯1 are not necessarily equal or unequal without imposing
extra condition on voter’s utility function. So we may have policy convergence (t¯0 = t¯1) or
divergence (t¯0 6= t¯1) in equilibrium. For example, in the left panel of Figure 1.3, we have
policy convergence, the two candidates propose the same tax rate in equilibrium, while in
the right panel of Figure 1.3, we have policy divergence in equilibrium. There is a general
perception that higher tax burden is related to the Democratic control of government or
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legislature. But there is no conclusive evidence in this regard in the empirical literature
(see, e.g., Besley and Case (1995), Alt and Lowry (2000), Reed (2006)). We contribute to
this debate by investigating the conditions, within our model framework, under which tax
policy convergence and divergence may emerge in equilibrium respectively.
1.4.1 Policy convergence
Homothetic preferences are the commonly used function forms when modeling consumers’
demand over various goods and services. In our model, we assume that voters have pref-
erences over after-tax income and two different public goods. Our next result shows that
if voters’ utility functions over two public goods, i.e., v(x0, x1, θ), are homothetic, then we
have policy convergence in equilibrium.
Definition 1.1. The utility function v(x0, x1, θ) is said to be homothetic, if it is a mono-
tonic transformation of a homogenous function. That is, there exists a strictly increasing
function g : R → R and a homogenous function f : R2 → R such that v = g ◦ f , where
f(tx0, tx1, θ) = t
kf(x0, x1, θ) for all t > 0 and some integer k.
An immediate result from homothetic utility function v(x0, x1, θ) is that, for any tax
rate t, a voter θ’s optimal allocation rule is constant (see the left panel of Figure 1.5), that
is, the expansion line for a voter θ is a ray from the origin. In this case, there exists a voter
type θ¯, who is always indifferent between the two candidates as long as the two candidates
propose the same tax rate, whatever the tax rate is. θ¯ is determined by the pair (α0, α1),
but as long as θ¯ has been determined, the optimal tax rate for voter θ¯ will be independent
of α0 and α1, so both candidates can maximize voter θ¯’s utility using the same tax rate. It
turns out that this type of voter θ¯ is the cut-off voter in equilibrium. Since both candidates
propose the same tax rate, and candidate 0 allocates more revenue to good 0 while less
revenue to good 1 than candidate 1, it is easy to check that the denominator in Equation
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1.2 is positive, so for any voter θ > θ¯, she will vote for candidate 0, for any voter θ < θ¯,
she will vote for candidate 1. Equation 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 can be satisfied simultaneously by
the same tax rate t¯ together with the cut-off voter type θ¯, we have tax policy convergence
in equilibrium.
Proposition 1.2 (Policy Convergence). Suppose the utility function of two public goods,
v(x0, x1, θ), is homothetic, and θm has a strictly positive density, then:
1. In the Nash equilibrium defined by the system of equations in Proposition 1.1, we have
policy convergence: t¯0 = t¯1 = t¯. That is, two candidates propose the same tax rate as
their platform in equilibrium.
2. Conversely, if (t¯, θ¯) satisfy Equation 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5, then it is a local equilibrium.
As long as the two candidates propose the same tax rate, then the cut-off voter type
θ¯ is uniquely determined, also by Equation 1.3 and 1.4, the optimal tax rate t¯ for θ¯ is
uniquely determined. Since the solution (t¯, θ¯) is unique, it must be the global equilibrium
if it exists.7
It is interesting to connect our results to Krasa and Polborn (2012), which character-
izes a class of uniform candidate ranking (UCR) voter preferences that generically lead
to policy convergence in equilibrium, even if candidates have differentiated characteristics.
UCR imposes no restrictions on voter preferences when candidates propose different policy
platforms, but if the two candidates propose the same policy, a voter with UCR preference
always prefers the same candidate. Actually, homothetic preferences over two public goods
in our model imply the UCR property, so even if two candidates consistently allocate differ-
ent fractions of tax revenue to two public goods at any tax rate, we get policy convergence
7Note that the above discussions of the existence of global equilibrium do not depend on whether the
equilibrium is convergent or divergent, so the conclusions can also be applied here, we will not repeat again.
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in equilibrium. To see this, we rewrite voters’ utility functions as following:
uθ(c, x0, x1) = c+ v(x0, x1, θ)
= 1− t+ v[αt, (1− α)t, θ]
= 1− t+ vθ(α, t).
(1.6)
So voter’s utility function over two public goods: v(α, t), is just a function of the fixed
candidate characteristics (α, the allocation rule) and flexible policy choices (t, the tax
rate). Now as long as the two candidates propose the same tax rate, we have a cut-off
voter θ¯ with vθ¯(α
0, t) = vθ¯(α
1, t), and voters with θ > θ¯ have vθ(α
0, t) > vθ(α
1, t) while
voters with θ < θ¯ have vθ(α
0, t) < vθ(α
1, t). So we have the following UCR property:
Definition 1.2 (Uniform Candidate Ranking, Krasa and Polborn (2012)). Utility functions
v(α, t) allow for a uniform candidate ranking (UCR) if, for all α0, α1 ∈ (0, 1) and all
t, t′ ∈ [0, 1],
v(α0, t) ≥ v(α1, t) if only if v(α0, t′) ≥ v(α1, t′). (1.7)
Since we have u(α, t) = 1 − t + v(α, t), UCR property of v(α, t) is equivalent to UCR
property of u(α, t), so we must have policy convergence in equilibrium.8 However, as Krasa
and Polborn (2012) has pointed out, UCR property is only a sufficient but not a necessary
condition to derive equilibrium policy convergence. Similarly, in our case, non-homothetic
v(x0, x1, θ) can still lead to policy convergence in equilibrium under certain circumstances.
Consider, for example, a utility function: 1−t+xθ0x1−θ1 −ln(xθ0x1−θ1 ), it’s not difficult to see
that for the voter type θ = 12 , she is indifferent between the two candidates with allocation
rules (α0, α1) such that α0 + α1 = 1, if they offer the same tax rate, and all other voters
strictly prefer exact one of the two candidates as in homothetic cases.
8More rigorously, we must have policy convergence in any strict Nash equilibrium if all voters have UCR
preferences; but in our case, we can show that for any t0 6= t1, at least one candidate’s winning probability
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Figure 1.5: Expansion lines and equilibrium
1.4.2 Policy divergence
In order to derive divergent tax rate policy in equilibrium, we must look for non-UCR
preferences. In our model, given any positive tax rate t, a higher voter type always prefers to
allocate more tax revenue to good 0, a lower voter type prefers more to good 1. Then what
we can expect if we fix a voter type, and ask her a question like “if the government increases
the tax rate, how should the extra revenue be spent?” For homothetic v(x0, x1, θ), we have
known that the allocation rule that a voter prefers is unchanged with the tax rate. However,
Jacoby (1994) performs an analysis of mass government spending preferences across a set
of policy areas using a national survey data, and finds that mass attitudes toward spending
on social programs are significantly positively related to overall attitudes on government
spending, but other programs including defense are either not related or negatively related.
Free and Cantril (1967) argues that the U.S. public want more expenditure on social
programs, but repeatedly demands for smaller government. Our understanding of these
is strictly smaller than the case where t0 = t1, so there is no equilibrium with t0 6= t1.
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findings is that as tax rate (and the implied government revenue) increases, voters expect
increasingly more share of tax revenue to be allocated to social program. Security is like a
kind of necessity, when the tax rate is low, voters may prefer the candidate who allocates
more on it, but as tax rate increases to some high level and beyond, voters may become
prefer the candidate who allocates more on social program. As tax rate increases, the
benefit from extra spending on security decreases dramatically beyond some level, while
social program still has higher substitutability with private consumption compared with
security program like defense, because it is more directly related to a voter’s well being.
This leads to a particular structure on voters’ utility functions. Analogous to the UCR
property defined above, we present the following strict single-crossing property (SSCP) for
voter preferences over two public goods:
Assumption 1.1 (Strict Single-Crossing Property). All voters’ utility functions over two
public goods: v(α, t), satisfy the following strict single-crossing property: 9
For all α > α′ and t > t′, v(α, t′)− v(α′, t′) ≥ 0 implies v(α, t)− v(α′, t) > 0.
The property simply says that the utility difference, v(α, t)−v(α′, t), as a function of t,
crosses the horizontal line only once at only one point, the usual (non-strict) single-crossing
property allows that the difference crosses the horizontal line for a continuum value of t
(see Figure 1.6 for the difference between single-crossing property and strict single-crossing
property). Actually, it’s not difficult to see that the UCR property implies single-crossing
property, but not strict single-crossing property.
In our model, we assume α0 > α1. Loosely speaking, this assumption implies that, at
lower tax rates, a voter θ may strictly prefer candidate 1 who allocates more tax revenue
to good 1; as tax rate increases, the voter will be indifferent between the two candidates
9see Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Edlin and Shannon (1998), for use of single-crossing property in
modeling politics, see Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006).
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t(a) Strict single-crossing property
t
(b) Single-crossing property
Figure 1.6: Strict and non-strict single-crossing property
at certain tax rate; then as the tax rate increases further, the voter will strictly prefer
candidate 0 to candidate 1 at any higher tax rate. In this sense, the property is so called
strict single-crossing. Here we can understand good 1 as a kind of necessity (e.g., security),
good 0 is some social program more directly related to voter welfare, such as social security
and/or health care.
For the utility functions v(x0, x1, θ), if v(x0, x1, θ) is “more concave” in x1 than in x0,
10
then the strict single-crossing property is satisfied. Because if a voter’s utility function
is “more concave” in x1 than in x0, the marginal benefit from extra spending on good 1
decreases faster than that from good 0. This captures the idea that as tax rate increases,
voters prefer an increasingly higher fraction of tax revenue to be spent on good 0 (e.g., social
programs) instead of good 1 (e.g., security-related programs). And, since v(x0, x1, θ) is
strictly concave, a voter’s preference is single-peaked with respect to tax rate, so given that
the two candidates propose the same tax rate, a voter likes more and more the candidate
10Here “more concave” means that the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion of v1(·) is greater
than that of v0(·), i.e., −x1v′′1 /v′1 > −x0v′′0 /v′0.
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who allocates more on good 0.11
Graphically, the expansion line of a voter θ is curved toward the expansion line of
candidate 0 (see the right panel of Figure 1.5). It’s not difficult to see that under this
condition, candidate 0 has comparative advantage when the tax rate is high, i.e., running
a big government, while candidate 1 has comparative advantage when the tax rate is
low, i.e., running a small government. This is different from the homothetic cases, where
both candidates and all voters have straight expansion lines from the origin, so there are
no comparative advantage or disadvantage for both candidates at either high or low tax
rate. We thus expect that in equilibrium, a candidate should choose the tax rate which
corresponds to his advantage, that is, candidate 0 should choose a higher tax rate to run
a big government, candidate 1 should choose a lower tax rate to run a small government.
This is indeed what the equilibrium looks like.
Proposition 1.3 (Policy Divergence). Suppose the utility function of two public goods
satisfy the strict single-crossing property in Assumption 1.1, and θm has a strictly positive
density, then:
1. In the Nash equilibrium defined by the system of equations in Proposition 1.1, we have
policy divergence: t¯0 6= t¯1. That is, two candidates propose different tax rates as their
platform in Nash equilibrium, actually, we have: t¯0 > t¯1, candidate 0 proposes a higher
tax rate.
2. Conversely, if (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) satisfy Equation 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5, then it is a local equilibrium.
The equilibrium like this is as in the right panel of Figure 1.5. The idea for proving
divergent tax rates is simple. Consider the system of equations in Proposition 1.1, the
11Actually, it is easy to check that if −x1v′′1 /v′1 = −x0v′′0 /v′0, i.e., v(x0, x1, θ) has the same concavity
between good 0 and good 1, then it is homothetic (the vice versa is also true), we go back to the first case
where we have policy convergence in equilibrium.
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summation of two partial derivatives, ∂v(x0,x1,θ¯)∂x0 α+
∂v(x0,x1,θ¯)
∂x1
(1−α) = ∂vθ¯(α,t)∂t = 1. Suppose
on the contrary there exists a solution (t¯, t¯, θ¯) solving the system, then the system implies
that vθ¯(α
0, t) and vθ¯(α
1, t) are equal at t¯ (by Equation 1.5), and their partial derivatives
with respect to t are also equal at t¯ (by Equation 1.3 and 1.4), which contradicts with the
fact that vθ¯(α, t) has the strict single-crossing property in Assumption 1.1. By Assumption
1.1, vθ¯(α
0, t) and vθ¯(α
1, t) can cross only once at only one point and from below, so if at t¯
the two are equal, then for any t > t¯, vθ¯(α
0, t) > vθ¯(α
1, t), so their derivatives with respect
to t cannot be equal at t¯.
Remember that candidate 0 has comparative advantage of running a big government,
candidate 1 has comparative advantage of running a small government, this gives the
centrifugal pressure for tax policy divergence. However, there is also centripetal pressure
for convergence because voters have trade-offs between private consumption and public
goods. In equilibrium, candidate 0 would not offer more good 1 than candidate 1, i.e., we
have x00 > x
1
0, x
0
1 < x
1
1. So Democrats will not impose a terribly high tax rate to have
a very big government, similarly, Republicans will not impose an ignorable tax rate to
have a very small government. Both Democrats and Republics choose not to trespass on
the issues (public goods) owned by their opponents. Candidate 0 offers more public good
0 than 1, while candidate 1 offers more public good 1 than 0. In this respect, the result
connects to the issue ownership literature which argues that candidates do not converge but
rather choose to emphasize the issues they have strength in, because they cannot benefit
from simply replicating their opponent platform (Petrocik (1996), Petrocik et al. (2003)).
The result also has its connection with Egan (2008), which demonstrates that Republicans
enjoy a long-run public opinion advantage over Democrats on issues of taxation, anti-crime
and national security; while Democrats are mostly trusted in large expenditure issues such
as education, health care and social security.
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In both cases (policy divergence and policy convergence), we have a cut-off voter type
θ¯ who is indifferent between the two candidates, voters with θ > θ¯ vote for candidate 0,
voters with θ < θ¯ vote for candidate 1. A candidate wins an election if and only if the
realized median voter θm strictly prefers him over his opponent, so if θm > θ¯, candidate 0
wins, if θm < θ¯, candidate 1 wins. We denote the cumulative distribution of θm as F , so
the winning probability of candidate 0 is 1−F (θ¯), the winning probability of candidate 1 is
F (θ¯). So if a candidate is strictly preferred by the median median voter, i.e., θ∗m such that
F (θ∗m) = 0.5, then he wins with probability greater than a half. However, we should notice
both the distribution of θm and the distribution of θ only affect the probability of winning
or who wins an election ex-post, the equilibrium results, including the cut-off voter type
and proposed tax rates are all rigid.
1.5 Welfare and comparative statics
1.5.1 Welfare
In the classical Downsian model, candidates compete to draw the median (or median me-
dian) voter’s attention, such that in equilibrium, two candidates are effectively equivalent
to all voters. While in our model, almost all voters (except for the cutoff voter) have strict
preference for one of the two candidates, and the cutoff voter in general (with probability 1)
is not the median voter. Under the equilibrium policy platform (t¯0, t¯1) (either t¯0 = t¯1 = t¯
or t¯0 6= t¯1), candidate 0 wins the election if and only if θm > θ¯. Since in equilibrium, can-
didate 0 chooses a tax rate to maximize the cutoff voter θ¯’s utility, the median voter θm’s
utility is not maximized by the winning candidate 0 unless Equation 1.3 is also satisfied
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for θm. To better understand this situation, we rewrite Equation 1.3 as following:
θ¯
∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 + (1− θ¯)∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1− α0) = 1. (1.8)
The right hand side is the marginal loss of money for one unit tax rate increasing, since we
normalize income equal to one, this marginal loss is always equal to one, and this is true for
both candidate 0 and candidate 1. The left hand side is the marginal utility gain from public
goods consumption for one unit tax rate increasing at t¯0. Note that we have two different
public goods, so this marginal utility gain is a weighted sum of marginal utility from two
public goods, ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 and ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0), and the weight is represented by the voter type
θ¯. If Equation 1.8 is also satisfied for θm, then we must have
∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 = ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1− α0) = 1,
that is, the marginal utility from tax rate increasing at t¯0 are equal to one for both good
0 and good 1, which happens with probability 0. As long as ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 6= ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1− α0), the
realized median voter θm and so a majority of voters would strictly prefer a different tax
rate other than what candidate 0, the winning candidate, has proposed in his campaign.
This is also true for candidate 1 winning the election, in which case θm < θ¯. So ex-post, a
majority of voters would strictly prefer the winning candidate not commit to his proposed
platform, this is true for both the convergence and divergence case above.
However, the direction of change that a majority of voters strictly prefer is not de-
terminant in our model, which differentiates our model with most existing models having
equilibrium policy convergence and/or divergence. Consider again that candidate 0 wins
the election, so we have θm > θ¯, and Equation 1.8 holds for θ¯. With probability 1, we have
∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 6= ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0), if ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 > ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0), i.e., 1−α0
α0
<
∂v0(·)
∂x00
∂v1(·)
∂x01
, then a majority
of voters would strictly prefer candidate 0 implement a higher tax rate when in office; if
∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 < ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1−α0), i.e., 1−α0
α0
>
∂v0(·)
∂x00
∂v1(·)
∂x01
, then a majority of voters would strictly prefer
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candidate 1 implement a lower tax rate when in office. Note that if ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 > ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1−α0),
then for one unit increasing of tax rate at t¯0, the marginal utility gain from good 0 is higher
than that from good 1. Since θm puts more weight on good 0 than the cutoff voter, the
weighted sum of two marginal utilities from good 0 and good 1 is greater than one, she
would strictly prefer a higher tax rate than t¯0. Conversely, if in equilibrium the marginal
utility gain from good 0 is lower than that from good 1, then θm would strictly prefer a
lower tax rate than t¯0. The situation is analogous for candidate 1 at the equilibrium tax
rate t¯1. We summarize our findings as the following proposition.
Proposition 1.4. Suppose (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) is an equilibrium defined in Proposition 1.1 in which
both candidates have a strictly positive winning probability, then with probability 1, ex-post,
a majority of voters would strictly prefer the winning candidate implement a different tax
rate t¯j
′
other than the proposed t¯j in his campaign.
1. Suppose candidate 0 wins, if ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 > ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0), then t¯0′ > t¯0, if ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 <
∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1− α0), then t¯0′ < t¯0.
2. Suppose candidate 1 wins, if ∂v0(·)
∂x10
α1 > ∂v1(·)
∂x11
(1 − α1), then t¯1′ < t¯1, if ∂v0(·)
∂x10
α1 <
∂v1(·)
∂x11
(1− α1), then t¯1′ > t¯1.
In the classical one-dimensional Downsian model, in equilibrium both candidates pro-
pose the same policy which maximizes the median voter’s utility, there is no other policy
platform or pair of policy platforms under which a majority of voters would strictly prefer.
In this sense, the equilibrium result is both ex-ante majority efficient and competition effi-
cient (Krasa and Polborn (2007)).12 In the citizen-candidate model (Osborne and Slivinski
12A candidate’s policy platform is ex-ante majority efficient if there is no other platform which is more
likely to make a majority of voters better off than worse off. Similarly, a pair of policy platform (t0, t1) is
competition efficient if a majority of voters is more likely to be better off than worse off under (t0, t1) than
under any other (t0′, t1′).
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(1996)), there is an equilibrium in which two candidates’ policy platforms are symmetri-
cally located at the opposite sides of the median voter, such that each candidate wins the
election with probability a half. It’s clear that, ex-post, a majority of voters would strictly
prefer the winning candidate (any of the two candidates) implement a more moderate poli-
cy than proposed. The same results imply in the models with policy-motivated candidates
(Calvert (1985)) and with entry deterrence (Palfrey (1984), Callander (2005)). In Krasa
and Polborn (2010a), two candidates with differentiated productivity in two public goods
compete with each other by choosing how much money (or effort) they will allocate to
each good when elected. In equilibrium, both candidates choose to allocate more mon-
ey to their area of expertise, in order to compete for the support from a moderate voter
type who usually differs from the expected median voter. From a welfare perspective, can-
didates in equilibrium are “excessively moderate”, almost certainly, a majority of voters
would strictly prefer the winning candidate focus more on his strength. We share the result
with Krasa and Polborn (2010a) that the equilibrium policy in our model is neither ex-ante
majority efficient nor competition efficient. However, in our model, the direction of change
that a majority of voters would strictly prefer is not determinant, which depends on the
comparison of marginal utility gain from good 0 and good 1 at the equilibrium tax rate.
1.5.2 Comparative statics
We now consider what would happen in equilibrium if one of the two candidates becomes
more extremeness in the way how to spend money. For example, suppose candidate 0
allocates a higher fraction of tax revenue to good 0, i.e., α0′ > α0, then the expansion
line of candidate 0 becomes flatter than before (Figure 1.7). In both the convergence and
divergence equilibrium, it’s clear that after the change, in the new equilibrium candidate 0
will lose the support from the previous cutoff voter θ¯. Since in any equilibrium, candidate
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Figure 1.7: More extremeness of candidate 0
0 is strictly preferred by relatively higher types, candidate 1 is strictly preferred by lower
types, and there is no way that candidate 0 can beat candidate 1 in winning the support
from θ¯, so in the new equilibrium, we must have θ¯′ > θ¯, where θ¯′ is the new cutoff voter
type. Thus the winning probability of candidate 0 strictly decreases. Similarly, if candidate
1 becomes more polarized (α1′ < α1), then we have θ¯′ < θ¯, the winning probability of
candidate 1 strictly decreases in the new equilibrium. So more extremeness is detrimental
for both candidates.
However, the direction of change for the new equilibrium tax rates is ambigous, the
reason is the same as in the welfare analysis. While the marginal loss of money from tax rate
increasing is always equal to one, the marginal utility gain from public goods consumption
is a weighted sum of marginal utility from two public goods. For example, if candidate 0
becomes more polarized, i.e., α0′ > α0, then for the new equilibrium (t¯0′ , t¯1′ , θ¯′), we have
θ¯′ > θ¯; if ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 > ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0), then t¯0′ > t¯0, because ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 > ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0) implies
∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0
′
> ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1 − α0′); if ∂v0(·)
∂x10
α1 < ∂v1(·)
∂x11
(1 − α1), then t¯1′ < t¯1, but the relationship
between t¯0
′
and t¯0 is not immediately clear even we know that ∂v0(·)
∂x00
α0 < ∂v1(·)
∂x01
(1− α0).
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a formal political competition model in which two candidates
have exogenously differentiated characteristics with respect to how to spend the government
revenue on two public goods when in office, yet are still able to propose different tax rate
policy in order to win the election. We analyzed how the different trade-offs over two public
goods among voters shape the equilibrium results. In equilibrium two candidates compete
for the support of a cut-off voter type who is indifferent between them as a result, and
in general this cut-off voter type is not the median or median median voter as in spatial
models. All other voters have strict preference on exact one of the two candidates.
We characterized the conditions under which policy convergence and divergence may
emerge in equilibrium. In particular, if voter preferences over two public goods are homo-
thetic, they will exhibit the UCR property as in Krasa and Polborn (2010a), assuming two
candidates’ platforms are same, a voter’s preferred candidate is unchanged with tax rate,
so in equilibrium two candidates propose the same tax rate. If instead they are non-UCR
preferences such that a voter’s preferred candidate changes at some tax rate, then we have
policy divergence in equilibrium. In our case, voters prefer the candidate who allocates
more on security good when the tax rate is low, but becomes to prefer the candidate who
allocates more on social good when the tax rate increases to certain level and beyond,
this gives two candidates different comparative advantages at low and high tax rates, in
equilibrium a candidate chooses the tax rate leveraging his advantage. All these results
are independent of the distribution of voter types.
We have also shown that the equilibrium results are not ex-ante majority efficient, that
is, after the election, a majority of voters would like the winning candidate to implement
a different tax rate other than what he has proposed in his campaign. And, a candidate’s
more extremeness in spending government revenue on his preferred program is detrimental
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for his winning probability.
Our model helps to answer the question when and why we should expect tax policy
convergence or divergence in political campaign. One possible extension is to add an
extra stage prior to this game where candidates’ fixed characteristics are formalized in
their respective primary election or chosen by their parties. Or, we can make candidates’
revenue allocation rules endogenously determined by their preferences. For example, as we
have discussed in the paper, if candidates have the same UCR preferences as voters, their
allocation rules will be constant over the tax rate, the same convergence equilibrium will
follow. But a more interesting case is to assume that as tax rate increases, a candidate’s
allocation rule also changes accordingly, e.g., we may assume that as tax rate increases,
both candidates spend more and more share of tax revenue on social good, though they
may not spend in the same way at any fixed tax rate. One of many examples satisfying
this property is the case where one public good is perfectly substitutable with private
consumption up to certain amount but the utility on the other public good is still concave.
Then both candidates will spend all tax revenue on one public good until some particular
but different level, after that any extra revenue will be spent on the other good. We can
reasonably expect policy divergence in equilibrium for this case.
33
Chapter 2
Sequential Coordination Games
with Endogenous Timing and
Payoffs
2.1 Introduction
In many economic and political situations, people can achieve more desirable outcomes if
they coordinate with each other. A classical example is the stag hunt game in which the
payoffs are known to all players. Another example is technology adoption (e.g., Katz and
Shapiro (1986)) where the payoff of adoption is an increasing function of the number of
consumers who adopt the technology. More often, people have asymmetric information
about the fundamentals that can lead to different payoffs at different state of the world.
For example, investors may have private information about the payoff of an investment
adventure; rebels may have personal knowledge about the benefit from overthrowing an
authoritarian regime or the persistence and capacity of dictators to repress a revolution
(Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011)).
Global games, originally defined by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), have been ex-
tensively used in the literature to study coordination games with asymmetric information
(for a good review, see Morris and Shin (2003)). Most global games in the literature are
either static or dynamic in the form of repeated games. We study sequential coordination
games instead in this paper. There are some situations that are essentially dynamic but
not appropriate to be modeled as repeated games. For example, a revolution may last
as long as a decade and different groups of rebels may mount the revolution at different
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stages; similarly, investors may join in an investment adventure at different times and it
takes some time to make money from the adventure. However, rebels can not revolt again
and again in a short time after failed attempts; and if you miss an investment opportunity,
it may not come again. It is natural to model these situations as sequential coordination
games.1
We add two additional features to sequential coordination games. The first is that
we allow players choose their time to move, so the timing of the game is endogenously
determined instead of exogenously given as in the herding literature (Banerjee (1992) and
Bikhchandani et al. (1992)). Consider a group of investors deciding whether to invest in a
start-up company, some investors may be more informed than others about the potential
of the start-up so they can make decisions earlier; while others opt to delay in order to
collect more information to help them make decisions. Also, there are always some leaders
who sparked a revolution and then were followed by their comrades. The second is that
we give the early mover a privilege to claim more share of benefit from the adventure. For
example, leaders of a revolution can often secure the highest positions in the new regime
and become the most powerful men; early investors in a start-up potentially can get higher
return than late investors. This privilege is not a free gift. Since the risky adventure
requires the participation of their opponents to succeed, early movers choose to do so at
their own perils, in the sense that if their opponents do not follow them to participate, an
extra cost or punishment will be imposed. The cost can be vested resources or even life
penalty in a failed revolution.
We frame the discussion as a sequential investment game based on Carlsson and van
Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (2003) in this paper. In particular, there are two
players deciding whether and when to invest in a project. The payoff of the project is
1The observability of early movers’ actions is automatically assumed in sequential coordination games,
since unobservability makes sequential and static games equivalent.
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uncertain and determined by a random draw over the real line. Players receive private
noisy signals about the payoff. If a player invests earlier, he has a privilege to claim more
share of benefit from the project, but an extra cost will be imposed if the other player does
not follow him to invest. The late player can observe his opponent’s action before him.
An equilibrium in the form of monotone strategy with symmetric cutoffs exists, in which
the player receiving higher signals would invest first, the player with intermediate signals
would delay and follow his opponent’s investment, but the player with lower signals would
never invest even if he observes his opponent’s investment before him.
The equilibrium result is intuitive. Receiving a high signal, a player expects that the
return on investment is attractive, he believes that his opponent’s signal is also good, and
he knows that his action to invest first potentially can trigger the investment from the
other player, for two reasons: first, it eliminates the uncertainty about his own action
faced by the other player; second, by investing first, the other player would know that
the first player’s private signal is a good signal, so increases the other player’s expectation
about the payoff. A player with too bad signal will not invest at all even if he waits and
observes that his opponent has already invested before him, though uncertainty about his
opponent’s action disappears and he is sure that there will be a successful coordination,
too bad signal means low expected return, it’s safe to keep the status quo. While a player
with intermediate signal would like to wait and see, an investment from the other player
would make him more optimistic about the payoff so he would follow to join in, otherwise
he would make the final decision: give up.
We also examine how the changing of punishment and reward for the first player affect
players’ behavior in equilibrium. Harsher punishment can suppress a player’s incentive to
invest first, but can give rise to more follow-up investment; similarly, increasing reward
for the first mover encourages more early investment but leading to less follow-up. For
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welfare, we show that as players’ signals become infinitely informative, i.e., as the noise of
private signals goes to zero, our sequential game has a positive welfare improvement over
the static game. Indeed, full efficiency can be realized in the sense that as long as the return
on investment is positive, both players will invest in the project. As the noise moves away
from the informative limit, which is zero, numerical analysis demonstrates that endogenous
timing and increasing reward to the first mover can effectively help coordination.
The effect of observational learning has been the subject of the herding literature s-
ince Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) under pure information externalities.
But the sequence of a herding game is often exogenously given and there is no strategic
complementarity. Chari and Kehoe (2004) considers endogenous timing but still without
strategic complementarities. Two other papers with endogenous timing but without strate-
gic complementarities include Chamley and Gale (1994) and Caplin and Leahy (1994). The
literature of dynamic global games examines the effect of learning but most of which are
in the form of repeated games (Chamley (1999), Angeletos et al. (2007), Huang (2011));
other sequential games often have a continuum of players so a player need not consider the
influence of his action on late players (Levin (2009)).
In the absence of dynamics, global games have been extensively used to model tech-
nology adoption (Zhu and Weyant (2003)), bank runs and currency attacks (Diamond
and Dybvig (1983), Morris and Shin (1998), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)), investmen-
t (Hubert and Schafer (2002)), and revolution (Svolik (2009), Shadmehr and Bernhardt
(2011), Persson and Tabellini (2009)). Strategic complementarity is the main subject in
these discussions.
Closely related works include Dasgupta (2007), Xue (2003) and Brindisi et al. (2014).
Dasgupta (2007) considers a canonical binary action two period global game, and allows
a continuum of players to delay their irreversible decisions. There is a cost to delay in
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investment but players who wait receive a private noisy signal about the aggregate level of
investment in the first period. Because there is a continuum of players and so individual
action is not observable, early players do not consider the influence of their actions on the
players who choose to wait in the first period, which is the main feature of our model. Xue
(2003) studies a similar problem but the asymmetric information is about the private cost
of the risky action; that is, players have independent types instead of correlated types as in
global games. So the effect of endogenous timing is only about eliminating the uncertainty
of opponent’s action, while in our model a player is able to partially transmit his private
signal to the other player by investing first. Another focus of his paper is about the role
of irreversibility of risky action in sequential coordination games. Brindisi et al. (2014)
is an experimental study of endogenous timing on global games, where late player pays
a fixed cost c for his delay. We also assume timing-related payoffs, but we give early
and late players different shares of return on investment and investigates how the benefit-
sharing parameter affects the coordination. The interaction between two players would be
an important feature of our game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model and briefly
reviews the static model as benchmark. Section 2.3 establishes the existence of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. Comparative statics and welfare will be discussed in Section 2.4.
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The model
Two players, i and j, decide whether to invest in a project. There is a safe action, not
invest, and a risky action, invest, which may give rise to a higher payoff if the other
player also invests. Players can choose what to play and when to play. Timing is discrete,
T = {1, 2, 3, · · · , T}. A player who opts to delay can observe and so learn from what have
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happened in previous stages, while an early mover can partially communicate his signal to
the player after him.
We assume the risky action (invest) is irreversible, so if a player invests in period t, his
investment will be sunk immediately, he will not be able to change his behavior after that.
But a player always has an option to invest if he has not done this so far. Though time T
can be any finite discrete number in general, later we will show that the game essentially
ends after two periods.2
Information about the payoff parameter θ is incomplete. We assume that the two
players share an improper common prior that θ is uniformly distributed on the real line.
Conditional on realization of θ, player i receives a private signal, xi = θ + εi, where
the noise εi is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ, the same
for player j. The noises are independent of θ and the two players’ noises, εi and εj ,
are independent with each other.3 We assume players are Bayesian, in the sense that
they update their posterior beliefs about the payoff θ and the signal distribution of their
opponents conditional on private signals and observed actions of their opponents, using the
Bayesian rule. For example, given private signal observation xi, player i will believe that
θ is normally distributed with mean xi and standard deviation σ, which in turn implies
that the other player’s signal is normally distributed with mean xi and standard deviation
√
2σ.
Let X ⊆ R be the signal space, H = {H1, H2, · · · , Ht, · · · } be the set of all possible
histories, Ht is the set of all possible histories up to period t (not including t), define
H1 = ∅. Ht is observable for both players at period t. So a pure strategy for player i is
a function si : X × H −→ {0, 1}T , where si(xi, ht) = 0 means “not invest”, si(xi, ht) =
2By “essentially ends”, we mean nobody would have incentive to change their behavior after the second
period. We will assume that a player would act early if there is no nonstrategic benefit of delay, this is
without loss of generality because any small positive cost of delay would make this work.
3We may abusely use i as either of the two players, and so j will be his opponent.
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1 means “invest”, note that we have a restriction on the pure strategy because of the
irreversibility of investing, that is, si(xi, ht+1) = 1 if si(xi, ht) = 1, for all t ∈ T and
ht+1 ∈ Ht+1.4 For simplicy, we denote si,t as the realized effective action of player i in
period t, so si,T will be the final action of player i when the game ends.
In the standard static global game, payoffs are symmetric (see Table 2.1). In our
sequential game, the payoffs are determined not only by both players’ actions but also by
the realized timing of play in the game. If the game ends up with no investment from
both players, then the status quo is preserved and we normalize the payoffs as (0, 0); if the
game ends up with investment from both players and they invest in the same period, then
payoffs are symmetric, ( θ2 ,
θ
2), the two players share the benefit equally; so the payoffs are
the same as in the static game if these two results happen. However, in this sequential
game, we will give the player who chooses to invest early the privilege to claim more share
of the realized payoff θ. So if a player invests first, he may get ρθ (ρ ∈ [12 , 1]), if the other
player follows to invest after him; but in the case that the other does not follow to invest
as the game ends, an extra cost µ will be imposed on the first player, he will get ρθ − µ.
In summary, for player i, his payoff is (where t is for some t ∈ T ):
ui =

0, if si,T = 0
θ
2 , if s
i,1 = sj,1 = 1, or si,t = sj,t = 0 and si,t+1 = si,t+1 = 1
ρθ − µ · 1{sj,T=0}, if si,t = 1, sj,t = 0
(1− ρ)θ, if si,t = 0, sj,t = 1, si,T = 1.
The timing of the game is: first, θ is selected by Nature and players observe private
signals about θ; then at period t = 1, players decide whether to invest or not, if both players
4Note also that si(xi, ht+1) = 0 implies that si(xi, ht) = 0.
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invest, the game ends and payoffs are realized, otherwise the game goes to period t = 2;
at the beginning of period t = 2, a players observes the action played by his opponent in
previous period, then the player who has’t chosen investment can choose to invest or wait
again until next period; the game may end in two cases: first, time is over; second, both
players cannot or have no incentive to change their actions anymore.
The sequential game is built upon the static game as in Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), Morris and Shin (2003), with new structure of timing and payoff. The static game
provides a benchmark for our analysis, we briefly introduce it here for later references.
In a static game, two players decide simultaneously whether to invest in a project. The
information structure is the same as above. The payoffs are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Payoffs of a static global game
Invest Not Invest
Invest θ2 ,
θ
2
θ
2 − µ, 0
Not Invest 0, θ2 − µ 0, 0
A pure strategy si is just a function mapping from each possible private signal to a
decision about whether to invest or not. It’s natural to think that if a player receives a
high value signal, he tends to invest, and has no incentive to invest if his signal is very
small. This kind of strategy is one that takes a cutoff form, that is, a player chooses to
invest if and only if he observes a private signal above some level ki:
si(xi) =

Invest, if xi > ki
Not Invest, if xi ≤ ki.
Now suppose that player j follows a switching strategy with cutoff kj , after observing
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his private signal xi, player i’s expected payoff from investing is
Pr(xj > kj | xi)E[θ
2
| xi, xj > kj ] + Pr(xj ≤ kj | xi)E[θ
2
− µ | xi, xj ≤ kj ]. (2.1)
Player i invests if and only if this expected payoff is greater than zero. Conditional on xi,
xj is normally distributed with mean xi and standard deviation
√
2σ. Simplifying Equation
2.1, we get 2.1 = xi2 −µΦ(
kj−xi√
2σ
),5 which is increasing in xi,
6 so the cutoff for player i would
be the unique ki solving the equation
xi
2
− µΦ(kj − xi√
2σ
) = 0. (2.2)
We denote the best response ki as BR
i(kj), so we now know that if player j adopts a cutoff
strategy, then i’s best response is also following a cutoff strategy. By Implicit Function
Theorem, it’s also easy to see that BRi(kj) is an increasing function of kj . Indeed, the
only strategy surviving iterated elimination of strictly interim-dominated strategies is the
symmetric strategy taking the cutoff form (see Morris and Shin (2003)). From Figure 2.1
we can see that the best response BR(k) is a contraction mapping.7 Solving BR(k) = k,
we get k = µ.
2.3 Equilibrium analysis
2.3.1 Preliminary
Analogous to the switching strategy with cutoff in the static 2 × 2 game, we are looking
for an equilibrium with monotone strategy, we define a monotone strategy in our setting as
5A reader may refer to Equation 2.3 and 2.4 for derivation details.
6Whenever we say “increasing” we mean “strictly increasing”, otherwise we will say “weakly increasing”
if weak increasing is allowed.
7For discussion about contraction mapping in global games, see Mathevet (2010).
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Figure 2.1: Best response: BRi(kj)
below:
Definition 2.1. A strategy is monotonic if for any ht ∈ Ht, there is a cutoff khti such that
if player i has not chosen investment before and xi > k
ht
i , then si(xi, ht) = 1; otherwise
si(xi, ht) = 0 (or si(xi, ht) = 1 if he has chosen investment before).
Our first observation is that, although in principle the game can last any T periods,
without loss of generality, the game can be reduced to a two period game. We establish
this result by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2.1. In any equilibrium with monotone strategies, for any t ≥ 2, if si,t−1 =
sj,t−1 = 0, then si,t = sj,t = 0.
Lemma 2.1 says that, in any period t, if both players find that nobody has chosen
“invest”, then neither of them will choose “invest”. This is equivalent to say that, if
both players choose “not invest” in the first period, then the game ends essentially, in the
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sense that no players would have incentives to change to “invest” in the following periods.
Intuitively, if both players choose “not invest” in the first period, the reason must be that
both players’ signals are not good enough to make the expected payoff favorite for them
to invest first. Note that at this stage, the only information that a player has about his
opponent’s signal is from his own signal, specifically, for i, j’s signal is normally distributed
with mean xi and standard deviation
√
2σ. Then at the beginning of the second period,
both players will observe that their opponents choose “not invest” as well in the previous
period, now for player i, besides the information that xj ∼ N(xi,
√
2σ), he also knows that
xj ≤ kh1j (kh1j ∈ R), so the expected payoff from even a successfully coordinated investment
would become lower, thus nobody will change to invest even though they have this option
available. In the first period, besides a player’s weak signal, there is uncertainty about his
opponent’s behavior. When the game goes to the second period, there is one more effect
from learning. In the case that si,1 = sj,1 = 0, this learning effect suppresses a player’s
motivation to invest.
Lemma 2.2. In any equilibrium with monotone strategies, for any t ≥ 2, for any player
i, if si,t = 0, then si,t+1 = 0.
Lemma 2.2 is equivalent to say that if a player chooses “not invest” in the second
period, then the player will not have any incentive to change his action in the future. Note
that si,t = 0 implies si,t−1 = 0. If sj,t−1 = 0 also holds, then Lemma 2.2 just repeats
what Lemma 2.1 says. So we only need to show that if sj,t−1 = 1 and si,t = 0, then
si,t+1 = 0. That is, if a player does not follow his opponent’s “invest” action immediately,
he will no longer follow to invest, this is intuitive because he will not get any more favorable
information in the future.
By Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2, only the following possibilities can happen in the game:
first, both players invest in the first period; or, one player invests first and the other one
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follows to invest in the second period; or, one player invests in the first period and the
other does not follow at all; or, neither invests in the first period and none of them will
switch to invest in the following periods. So, without loss of generality, the game can be
reduced to a two period game shown as in Table 2.2, where “n/a” indicates the result can
not happen in equilibrium, e.g., we can not have the result that both players invest in the
second period.
Table 2.2: Payoffs of a reduced two period game
Invest First Wait, then Invest Wait, then Not Invest
Invest First θ2 ,
θ
2 ρθ, (1− ρ)θ ρθ − µ, 0
Wait, then Invest (1− ρ)θ, ρθ n/a n/a
Wait, then Not Invest 0, ρθ − µ n/a 0, 0
In this reduced two period game, a monotone strategy will have two cutoffs. For a
player i, his monotone strategy will look like this:
si(xi, ht) :

si(xi, h1) = 1, if xi > k
1
i
si(xi, h1) = 0, si(xi, h2) = 1, if k
1
i ≥ xi > k2i , and j invests first
si(xi, h1) = 0, si(xi, h2) = 0, if k
1
i ≥ xi > k2i , and j does not invest first
si(xi, h1) = si(xi, h2) = 0, if xi ≤ k2i .
In words, if a player’s signal is strong enough, he will choose to invest in the first period; if
his signal is very bad, he will never invest even if in the second period he observes that the
opponent invests first; if his signal is in the middle range, he will postpone his decision to
the second period, so if the opponent invests in the first period, he will follow his opponent
to invest, otherwise he will no longer invest. The first proposition in next section will tell
us that given the opponent follows this monotone strategy, the best response of a player
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has the same feature.
We now present two technical results which will be used several times later in this paper.
Recall that if a random variable Y is normally distributed with mean η and standard
deviation ν, then conditional on Y > a, the expected value of Y : E[Y |Y > a] = η +
√
ν
φ(a−η√
ν
)
1−Φ(a−η√
ν
)
, where φ and Φ are the probability density function (pdf) and cumulative
distribution function (cdf) of standard normal distribution, respectively. So conditional on
player i’s private signal xi and the information contained in player j’s decision to invest
first (xj > k
1
j ), the expected value of θ:
E[θ|xi, xj > k1j ]
= E{E[θ|xi, xj ]|xi, xj > k1j }
= E{xi+xj2 |xi, xj > k1j }
= xi2 +
1
2 [xi +
√
2σ
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
]
= xi +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
(2.3)
Similarly, we can get:
E[θ|xi, xj ≤ k1j ] = xi −
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
(2.4)
2.3.2 Equilibrium characterization
We are looking for an equilibrium with monotone strategies, the first proposition says that
if the opponent adopts a monotone strategy with cutoffs, then a player’s best response also
has the same feature.
Proposition 2.1. Given player j follows a monotone strategy with cutoffs (k1j , k
2
j ) ∈ R×R,
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the best response of player i is also monotonic with some cutoffs (k1i , k
2
i ) ∈ R × R, where
k1i and k
2
i are uniquely determined.
The detailed proof is given in the Appendix. Recall that if both player i and j choose
“not invest” in the first period, the game will end immediately. Now consider the case
where si,1 = 0, sj,1 = 1, then in the second period, player i observes that j has chosen
“invest”, his expected net payoff from choosing “invest” is (1− ρ)E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ], which
is increasing in xi by Lemma A.2 in the Appendix (unless ρ = 1). So we can find a cutoff
k2i such that if xi > k
2
i , player i will follow j to choose “invest”, otherwise he will choose
“not invest” even if he knows j has already invested.
Now go back to the first period, player i compares his expected payoff from choosing
“1” with “0”. If he chooses “1”, his expected payoff is:
[1− Φ(k
1
j−xi√
2σ
)]E[12θ | xi, xj > k1j ] + [Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)− Φ(k
2
j−xi√
2σ
)]E[ρθ | xi, k2j < xj ≤ k1j ]
+Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)E[ρθ − µ | xi, xj ≤ k2j ].
(2.5)
If he chooses “0”, the expected payoff is:
[1− Φ(k
1
j − xi√
2σ
)](1− ρ)E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ]. (2.6)
So the expected net payoff from “1”, 2.5− 2.6, is:
ρxi − µΦ(
k2j − xi√
2σ
)− 1
2
[1− Φ(k
1
j − xi√
2σ
)]E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ]. (2.7)
Figure 2.2 describes how this expected net payoff changes with private signal xi. Observe
that this net payoff is not necessarily monotone increasing in xi. We have three parts
in Equation 2.7, it’s clear that the first part, ρxi, is increasing in xi; the second part,
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µΦ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
), is decreasing in xi, so its negative is increasing. However, for the third part,
both 1−Φ(k
1
j−xi√
2σ
) and E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] are increasing in xi (see Lemma A.2 in Appendix).
Simplifying further by substituting xi +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
for E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] into Equation
2.7 gives:
(ρ− 1
2
)xi − µΦ(
k2j − xi√
2σ
) +
1
2
Φ(
k1j − xi√
2σ
)xi −
√
2
4
σφ(
k1j − xi√
2σ
). (2.8)
It’s derivative is:
(ρ− 1
2
) +
µ√
2σ
φ(
k2j − xi√
2σ
) +
1
2
Φ(
k1j − xi√
2σ
)− xi + k
1
j
4
√
2σ
φ(
k1j − xi√
2σ
). (2.9)
The first three parts are all positive. For the last part,
xi+k
1
j
4
√
2σ
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
), it’s not difficult
to see that when xi is very small (e.g., xi < −k1j ),
xi+k
1
j
4
√
2σ
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
) is negative; when xi is
large enough, φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
) converges to zero very quickly, so the derivative get a positive sign;
but in some middle range of xi, we may have a relatively big value for both φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
) and
xi+k
1
j
4
√
2σ
, so the derivative may have a negative sign. Intuitively, if a player’s private signal is
very weak, it is safe for him to choose “not invest” in the first period, if his private signal
is strong enough, it is also absolutely safe for him to choose “invest”, but for some small
range of private signal, it becomes more risky to choose either “not invest” or “invest”, the
expected net payoff from investing is up and down.
However, we can show that in any case Equation 2.7 does cross the horizontal line only
once, and from below, so an unique cutoff k1i exists, such that if xi > k
1
i , we have 2.7 > 0,
if xi ≤ k1i , 2.7 ≤ 0, as in Figure 2.2.
We can get more from Equation 2.8. It can be seen that for any xi ≤ 0, Equation 2.8
is negative, so the cutoff k1i must be greater than zero. Also, since the cutoff k
2
i satisfies
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Figure 2.2: ϕ1: i’s expected net payoff as a function of xi
k2i +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−k2i√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−k2
i√
2σ
)
= 0, we have k2i < 0, together we can say that in any equilibrium
with monotone strategies, the cutoff k1i > 0, and the cutoff k
2
i < 0, similarly we should
have k1j > 0 and k
2
j < 0 in equilibrium. Recall that in the static game, in order to have a
successfully coordinated investment, both players’ signals must be positive (xi, xj > µ > 0);
however, in our endogenous timing game, we will have successful coordination with positive
probability even if one player has a positive signal and the other has a negative one.
In Proposition 2.1, we restrict player j’s cutoffs (k1j , k
2
j ) ∈ R×R, it will be interesting
to see what will happen if k1j and/or k
2
j can be infinity. We present this as a corollary.
Corollary 2.1. If k1j = −∞ (so is k2j ), that is, player j always invests in the first period,
then k1i = k
2
i = 0, player i will invest first if and only if xi > 0, otherwise he will not
invest;
If k2j = ∞ (so is k1j ), that is, player j never invests, then k1i = k2i = µρ , i will invest
49
first if and only if xi >
µ
ρ , otherwise not invest;
If k1j = ∞ and k2j = −∞, that is, player j always invests in the second period, then
k1i = k
2
i = 0, i will invest first if and only if xi > 0, otherwise not invest;
If k1j =∞ but k2j ∈ R, then there is an unique k1i > 0 satisfying ρk1i − µΦ(
k2j−k1i√
2σ
) = 0,
i will invest first if and only if xi > k
1
i , otherwise not invest;
If k1j ∈ R but k2j = −∞, then there is an unique pair of cutoffs (k1i , k2i ) ∈ R×R.
In previous analysis, we assume that one of the two players adopts a monotone strategy,
then we show that the other player’s best response is also in the form of monotone strategy.
Actually, it’s pretty natural to think about why the strategy should be monotone. Let’s
assume the worst case for player i, that is, player j never invests in the project. Then
according to Corollary 2.1, we can conclude that even if player j never invests, player i
will invest first if xi >
µ
ρ , and will not invest if xi ≤ µρ . Note that this is the worst case for
player i, so player j can reasonably believe that i will invest in the first period if xi >
µ
ρ .
Given this, j can either invest in the first period or postpone his decision to next period.
Then from Equation A.17 and A.22, we can get that there exists a pair of (k1j , k
2
j ) such that
j will invest in the first period if xj > k
1
j , will invest in the second period if k
2
j < xj ≤ k1j ,
will not invest if xj ≤ k2j , which justifies a monotone strategy, then by Proposition 2.1,
player i’s best response is also monotone with some cutoffs (k1i , k
2
i ).
If player i invests first, then potentially he may get a higher share of realized payoff if
ρ > 12 . From Equation 2.8 we can see that, at 2.8 = 0, the left hand side is increasing in
both ρ and xi, so as ρ increases, the cutoff k
1
i will decrease, he will have higher probability
to invest in the first period, more reward gives more incentive to take a risky action in
the first period. Similarly, since the left hand side of Equation 2.8 is decreasing in µ, as µ
increases, k1i increases, that is, if the punishment becomes harsher for failed coordination,
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then i will invest less often in the first period, harsher punishment suppresses his incentive
to take a risky action first. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2. Given j adopts a monotone strategy with cutoffs (k1j , k
2
j ), i’s cutoff k
1
i is
decreasing in ρ, and increasing in µ.
Now we examine how i’s cutoff (k1i , k
2
i ) would change according to the change of (k
1
j , k
2
j ).
An immediate result from of Equation A.17 in the proof (see Appendix) is that, if player
j increases his cutoff k1j , that is, if player j is less likely to choose “invest” in the first
period, then player i’s cutoff k2i will decrease. The intuition behind is that, as k
1
j increases,
player j has more stringent criterion to choose “invest” in the first period, in this case, if
player i observes that player j has chosen “invest”, he will have higher expected payoff from
following j’s choice even if his signal xi becomes a little bit lower than before; conversely,
if k1j decreases, player i will increase his cutoff k
2
i , he will tend to follow less even if he
observes that player j has invested already, because the expected payoff will be lower at
the original cutoff. Similarly, from Equation 2.7 we can get as k2j increases, k
1
i increases.
So if player i knows that j has smaller probability to mount on “invest” after him, he will
not rush to invest in the first period, having a tendency to wait more until the second
period to see what would have happened in the first period. We can see that strategic
complements and substitutes coexist between the two periods in a two player endogenous
timing coordination game, in the static game, we only have strategic complements.8
From Equation A.17 and Equation 2.7, it’s also clear that k2j does not have any effect on
k2i , this is true because i in the second period only cares about whether j has invested first
and what is j’s cutoff rule for the first period. The effect of k1j on k
1
i is more complicated.
8Strategic complement means if one player acts more aggressively (e.g., invests more), then the other
one has higher marginal benefit from acting in the same way (so will invest more). Strategic substitute is
defined analogously. See Bulow et al. (1985).
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Define
ϕ2(k1i , k
1
j , k
2
j ) = (ρ−
1
2
)k1i − µΦ(
k2j − k1i√
2σ
) +
1
2
Φ(
k1j − k1i√
2σ
)k1i −
√
2
4
σφ(
k1j − k1i√
2σ
). (2.10)
At ϕ2(k1i , k
1
j , k
2
j ) = 0, we have k
1′
i (k
1
j ) = −(ϕ2′k1i )
−1(ϕ2′
k1j
), since ϕ2′
k1i
> 0, so sgnk1′i (k
1
j ) =
−sgnϕ2′
k1j
. Note that
ϕ2′
k1j
= 12k
1
i φ(
k1j−k1i√
2σ
) 1√
2σ
+
√
2σ
4 φ(
k1j−k1i√
2σ
)12
k1j−k1i√
2σ
1√
2σ
= 1
8
√
2σ
φ(
k1j−k1i√
2σ
)(k1j + 3k
1
i ).
(2.11)
As far as equilibrium is concerned, k1j ≤ 0 is not plausible, because it is strictly dominated
by any k1j > 0 given any cutoff k
1
i . Together with k
1
i > 0, we have ϕ
2′
k1j
> 0, thus k1′i (k
1
j ) < 0.
That is, for plausible k1j , k
1
i is monotone decreasing in k
1
j , as j invests more in the first
period, player i will invest less in the first period, so we have strategic substitute effect
between two players’ strategies in the first period. In a standard global game, as the
static game before, if a player invests more, then the other is more likely to be joined by
his opponent if he also invests, so he is less likely to be punished. This effect drives the
strategic complements between players. But here we assume k2j is constant and let k
1
j vary,
the probability that player i will be joined by j does not change. So in our model, the
driving force is different. The varying of k1j only has effect on how much player i would be
able to claim in a successfully coordinated project, the difference from investing first and
investing later is 12θ − (1 − ρ)θ = (ρ − 12)θ. As j invests more (lower k1j ), it’s more likely
that the realized θ is smaller, the attraction of this difference is becoming less, so i invests
less in the first period. As j invests less (bigger k1j ), player i will expect that a successful
project will be more beneficial, he will invest more at the first time in order to claim more
share from the project, so there is a form of competition between two players which drives
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the strategic substitution between them.
We summarize our findings as a corollary.
Corollary 2.3. Given player j using a monotone strategy with cutoffs (k1j , k
2
j ), player i’s
cutoffs (k1i , k
2
i ) in his best response has the following properties:
k1i is monotone increasing in k
2
j ;
k2i is monotone decreasing in k
1
j ;
k2j has no effect on cutoff k
2
i ;
For k1j > 0, k
1
i is monotone decreasing in k
1
j .
In other words, as k1j increases, both k
1
i and k
2
i decreases; as k
2
j increases, k
1
i increases but
k2i does not change.
In this paper, we are looking for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth PBE) in
monotone strategy with symmetric cutoffs, that is, we restrict k1i = k
1
j , k
2
i = k
2
j .
Proposition 2.2. There exists a unique PBE in monotone strategy with symmetric cutoffs,
and the pair of cutoffs (k1, k2) is defined by the following two equations:
k2 +
√
2σ
2
φ(k
1−k2√
2σ
)
1− Φ(k1−k2√
2σ
)
= 0 (2.12)
(ρ− 1
4
)k1 − µΦ(k
2 − k1√
2σ
)−
√
2
4
σφ(0) = 0. (2.13)
The equilibrium result is immediate from Proposition 2.1, that is, given player j using
monotone strategy with cutoffs (k1, k2), player i’s best response is also monotonic with the
same cutoffs, because both Equation A.17 (in Appendix) and Equation 2.7 exhibit strict
single crossing property. For the uniqueness, note that from Equation 2.12, k2 is decreasing
in k1, but from Equation 2.13, k1 is increasing in k2, thus the two equations have an unique
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root (see, e.g., Figure 2.3). As we have said before, it can be easily seen that we must have
k1 > 0 and k2 < 0 in solutions.
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Figure 2.3: Uniqueness of equilibrium with symmetric cutoffs
In the static global game, it can be shown that the unique equilibrium with symmetric
cutoff can be achieved by iterated deletion of strictly interim-dominated strategies. Re-
member that in the static global game, we define BR(k) as the best response for a player
when his opponent follows a strategy with cutoff k. If a strategy si survives n rounds of
iterated deletion of strictly interim-dominated strategies, then:
si(xi) =

Invest, if xi > BR
n−1(2µ)
Not Invest, if xi ≤ BRn−1(0).
Observe that in the static game, “Invest” is a dominant strategy when the expected value
of θ is greater than 2µ, “Not invest” is a dominant strategy when the expected value of θ is
smaller than zero. As n goes to infinity, from Figure 2.1 we can see that both BRn−1(2µ)
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and BRn−1(0) converges to µ. Now the question is can we achieve our symmetric equi-
librium in the endogenous timing game by iterated deletion of strictly interim-dominated
strategies? The starting point would be the existence of a dominant strategy if such itera-
tion works.
In general, because in our game timing is endogenous and so an optimal strategy is
history dependent, a dominant strategy does not exist in many cases. For example, suppose
in the second period, player i observes that j has already invested in the first period, then
“invest” is a dominant strategy for i if xi > 0, because his expected payoff from investing
is at least E[(1−ρ)θ | xi] = (1−ρ)xi. However, “not invest” can never be dominant in this
case, because according to Corollary 2.3, his optimal cutoff k2i is decreasing in k
1
j , there is
no k2i such that “not invest” is dominant if xi ≤ k2i .
We have argued that if player j never invests, then i’s best response is to invest first if
and only if xi >
µ
ρ , which seems like a dominant strategy. However, if j has some cutoff k
1
j
for investing in the first period, but in the second period i finds that j has not invested,
then it is no longer optimal for i to invest for any xi >
µ
ρ . Also, if k
1
j is loose enough, i.e., k
1
j
is very small, it is not necessarily optimal for i to invest in the first period even if xi >
µ
ρ .
Because his expected payoff from investing first can be very bad even if j also invests first,
or even worse if j does not invest first, and he always has an option to delay his decision,
such that he can secure some expected payoff if in the second period he observes that j
has invested. So “action monotonicity”, another condition to get an iterative equilibrium
solution for the static global game, is also not satisfied in our endogenous timing game.9
9“Action monotonicity” means that the incentive to invest more is increasing in the probability of the
other player’s investment action. For more details, see Morris and Shin (2003), Levin (1999).
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2.4 Comparative statics and welfare analysis
2.4.1 Comparative statics
In our model, if one player invests first, and the other one does not follow to invest, then
a loss µ will be imposed on the first mover. We now present how a change of this loss has
effect on players’ behavior in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3. If the loss µ imposed on the first mover in a miscoordination increases,
then both players will invest less often in the first period (k1 increases), but follow more
often in the second period (k2 decreases).
The proposition tells us that in equilibrium, as µ increases, the first mover will leave
more space to the follower, since the difference between k1 and k2 increases. This result is
intuitive because as the punishment becomes harsher, players tend to play the game more
safely, so the criterion for the first mover become more stringent than before; as the first
mover acts in a more conservative way, the second mover will tend to follow more because
the expected payoff becomes higher than before in a successful coordination. The different
effects on k1 and k2 are coming from the endogenous timing structure of the game. See
the left panel of Figure 2.4 for an example.
We’re also interested in how the share parameter ρ can affect the equilibrium result,
for example, if we give more share of benefit to the first mover in a successful coordination
(suppose the other follows to invest in the second period rather than invest simultaneously
in the first period), what can we expect? Intuitively, the effect of ρ should be opposite to
the effect of µ, more share of benefit works like extra reward which gives more incentive
for players to move first, so k1 should decrease; accordingly, k2 should increase, because
of two effects: first, the share of benefit left to the follower, (1 − ρ), is lower than before;
second, because k1 decreases, the first mover has a lower criterion for investing, so for the
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second mover, the expected benefit from a successful coordination becomes less favorably
than before. We state the result as Proposition 2.4. An example can be seen in the right
panel of Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Change of the cutoffs (k1, k2) as a function of µ (a) and ρ (b)
Proposition 2.4. If the share of benefit ρ for the first mover in a successfully coordinat-
ed investment increases, then both players will invest more often in the first period (k1
decreases), but follow less often in the second peroid (k2 increases).
Conditional on any θ, the overall probability of failed coordination is:10
∫ k1
−∞
φ(
xj − θ
σ
)dxj
∫ k1
−∞
φ(
xi − θ
σ
)dxi + 2
∫ k2
−∞
φ(
x− θ
σ
)dx
∫ ∞
k1
φ(
x− θ
σ
)dx, (2.14)
in which the first part is the probability for the case where nobody invests in the first
period, so no punishment will be imposed; the second part, 2
∫ k2
−∞ φ(
x−θ
σ )dx
∫∞
k1 φ(
x−θ
σ )dx,
is the probability for the case where one of the two players invests first but the other does
not follow to invest in the second period, so punishment will be imposed on the first mover.
Because k1 is increasing in µ while k2 is decreasing in µ, it’s not difficult to see that the
10Note that conditional on θ, two players’ signals are independent with each other.
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probability of punishment incidence is monotone decreasing in µ. This is true for both the
overall probability of punishment incidence and the probability of being punished for the
marginal player in the first period, i.e., the player whose signal is k1. The result is different
from the punishment dilemma presented in Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2011). Conversely,
as ρ increases, the probability of punishment incidence increases, because the increasing of
share of benefit gives more reward to the first mover letting him take more risk, and at the
same time the second mover invests less often than before.
Corollary 2.4. The overall probability of punishment incidence, and the probability of
being punished for the marginal player in the first period, are decreasing in µ, and increasing
in ρ.
Conditional on θ, the overall probability of successful coordination is:
∫ ∞
k1
φ(
xj − θ
σ
)dxj
∫ ∞
k1
φ(
xi − θ
σ
)dxi + 2
∫ ∞
k1
φ(
x− θ
σ
)dx
∫ k1
k2
φ(
x− θ
σ
)dx, (2.15)
in which the first part is the probability for the case where two players simultaneously invest
in the first period; the second part is the probability for the case where one of the two
players invests first and the other one follows to invest in the second period, so coordination
also implies. It should be clear that, the probability of simultaneous investment in the
first period,
∫∞
k1 φ(
xj−θ
σ )dxj
∫∞
k1 φ(
xi−θ
σ )dxi, is monotone decreasing in µ. Conversely, as
ρ increases, the probability of simultaneous investment in the first period increases, both
players becomes more rush to invest first in order to have the privilege to claim the higher
share of expected payoff.
However, the overall probability of successful coordination (and the implied probability
of failed coordination) is more complicated. In the standard static game, a player will
invest if and only if his private signal is greater than µ, and the coordination succeeds if
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and only if both of the two players invest, so as µ increases, the probability of successful
coordination decreases. However, in our endogenous timing game, as µ increases, although
a player is less likely to invest in the first period (because k1 increases), there is an extra
effect on decreasing of k2, which leads to more follow-up from the other player when one
of the two players invests first but the other one waits and see. Similarly, as ρ increases,
although a player is more likely to invest in the first period (because k1 decreases), there is
an extra increasing effect on k2, so in the case that one of the two players already invests,
the other player follows less often than before to invest in the second period. So whether
increasing of µ (or ρ) leads to more or less successful coordination in this game depends on
which effect dominates in equilibrium. There are no closed form solutions for the system of
Equation 2.12 and 2.13, and the probability of successful coordination also depends on the
true value of θ. This is more about welfare implications of our model, so in next section,
we will use numerical methods to examine these effects.
2.4.2 Welfare implication
In the static game, a player i invests if and only if xi > µ, so when the two players’ signals
are both smaller than µ, coordination fails and payoffs are (0, 0). This is true even if
private signals become infinitely informative (i.e., as σ goes to zero), because the cutoff µ
does not depend on the level of noise. However, it’s still worth for the two players’ to invest
when 0 < θ ≤ µ, we see efficiency loss here. In our endogenous timing game, it’s clear
from Equation 2.12 and 2.13 that the pair of cutoffs (k1, k2) is dependent on σ, we show
in Appendix that as σ goes to zero, k1 converges to zero from above while k2 converges
to zero from below. Compared with the static game, as private signals become infinitely
informative, endogenous timing can help to minimize the efficiency loss when 0 < θ ≤ µ;
players will invest in the project for almost all cases where the investment is profitable, we
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have a positive welfare improvement.
Proposition 2.5. As the level of noise in private signals goes to zero (i.e., σ → 0), the
cutoff for investing in the first period converges to zero from above k1 → 0+, the cutoff for
following-up in the second period converges to zero from below k2 → 0−.
As the noise level moves away from zero, analytical comparison of the welfare between
the static and endogenous timing game becomes more difficult, as closed form solution does
not exist. So we demonstrates the pure effect of endogenous timing numerically. In doing
this, we choose ρ = 12 , make all parameter values the same between the static game and our
endogenous timing game, and let θ change at different levels of µ. We expect that, because
endogenous timing offers a channel for players to partially communicate their signals to
their opponents, it should help the two players coordinate more often than the static game.
From Figure 2.5 we can see that at three different levels of µ, for a continuum of θ, the
probabilities of coordination in the endogenous timing game are all greater than in the
static game. There are some other patterns in Figure 2.5 worth to be mentioned. First,
the probability of coordination is higher in the endogenous timing game for all value of θ,
even if θ < 0, in this case coordination is actually a bad option for two players, endogenous
timing game is more detrimental compared with the static game. However, as θ becomes
positive and increases further, the probability gain from endogenous timing is increasingly
higher for a large range of positive θ, since ex-ante players do not know the true value
of θ, overall the welfare is improved by changing the game from a static version to an
endogenous timing version. Second, when µ is higher, the probability gain is higher, since
the increasing of µ suppresses the probability of coordination in both games, we can say
that it suppresses more in the static game than in the endogenous timing game. When the
punishment is harsher, endogenous timing leads to more welfare improvement.
Then we want to show how the change of µ, the punishment parameter, influences the
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Figure 2.5: Compare coordination probability, ρ = 12 , σ = 1
overall probability of successful coordination. In doing this, we fix the value of σ and let
µ change at different levels of ρ and θ. In the left panel of Figure 2.6, we fix θ = 0, let
µ change at three different levels of ρ, we can see that as µ increases, the probability of
coordination decreases; similarly, in the right panel of Figure 2.6, we fix ρ = 0.6, let µ
change at three different levels of θ, it’s also clear that the probability of coordination is
decreasing in µ. So the increasing of µ can effectively suppress the coordination in our
game, the same as in the static game. From Figure 2.6(a) we can also see that at any level
of µ, higher value of ρ leads to a higher probability of coordination. We will examine more
details about the effect of ρ in the following.
Now we examine the effect of the share parameter, ρ, on the probability of successful
coordination. We fix the value of σ and let ρ change at different levels of µ and θ. Figure 2.7
shows how the change of ρ (from 12 to 1) affects the probability of successful coordination at
different levels of µ and θ respectively. The patterns in the figure validates our conjecture
that as ρ increases, the probability of coordination increases. Increasing the reward to the
first mover can effectively help the coordination in endogenous timing game. And Figure
2.7(a) confirms again that µ has negative effect on the probability of coordination. In
conclusion, from these numerical examples we can see that endogenous timing can help
61
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
µ
Pr
ob
 o
f C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n
ρ=0.5
ρ=0.6
ρ=0.7
(a) For different levels of ρ, θ = 0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
µ
Pr
ob
 o
f C
oo
rd
in
at
io
n
θ = 0
θ = − 0.5
θ = 0.5
(b) For different levels of θ, ρ = 0.6
Figure 2.6: Coordination probability as a function of µ
coordination when players have private incomplete information about the state of the
world, and increasing the payoff to the first mover can strengthen this effect, increasing
the extra loss in the case of failed coordination is detrimental for coordination.
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Figure 2.7: Coordination probability as a function of ρ
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2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a sequential coordination game where players can choose what
to play and when to play. The player opting to delay can observe his opponent’s action
before him but shares a smaller fraction of return on investment; the player who invests
first has a privilege to claim more share of benefit from the investment but does so at his
own peril: if the other players does not follow him to invest, an extra cost will be imposed.
The first player also knows that his investment in the first period can potentially trigger
the follow-up from his opponent. The possible situations this model can be applied include
investment, revolution, bank runs and currency attacks, and new technology adoption.
In equilibrium, both players adopt a monotone strategy with symmetric cutoffs. A
player with higher signals would invest first, a player with lower signals would never invest,
while a player with intermediate signals would wait and see: if he observes his opponent’s
investment before him, he will follow to invest, otherwise he will not invest. We also show
that harsher punishment leads to less investment in the first period, but gives rise to more
follow-up investment, because more stringent criterion to invest first means the expected
return is high in the case that there is someone who invests first; similarly, increasing reward
for the first mover encourages more early investment but leading to less follow-up. The
overall probability of punishment incidence is decreasing in the harshness of punishment
and increasing in the reward for the first mover. For welfare, we show that as players’
signals become infinitely informative, i.e., as the noise of private signals goes to zero, our
sequential game has a positive welfare improvement over the static game. Indeed, complete
efficiency can be realized in the sense that as long as the return on investment is positive,
both players will invest in the project. As the noise moves away from zero, numerical
analysis demonstrates that endogenous timing and increasing reward to the first mover
can effectively help coordination, harsher punishment can suppress coordination.
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It might be interesting to consider the case where the first player can stake out the
proportion of return he can claim after a successful investment when he invests earlier
than his opponent, that is, to endogenize the parameter ρ in current model. It’s clear
that in this case, there is still a cutoff for the player who delays his action to follow up
the first player’s investment. Because the symmetry of the game, we may expect that in
equilibrium, the two players use the same cutoffs as in current game and endogenously claim
the same proportion of return for their early risky actions. Then the remaining problem
is just to show that the first moving player has no incentive to request more when plays
the game. However, in this new game, the change of requested share for the first mover
does not change the cutoff for the second player’s follow-up action; so the first player does
have incentive to deviate from the common requested share of benefit that we conjecture
in equilibrium, he always wants to request more. So the only possible equilibrium in the
new game is the one where the first player can claim all return on investment.
Researchers may also consider the case where there is a different benefit-sharing struc-
ture. For example, in a revolution game, it might be more appropriate to assume that if the
first player revolts but the other player does not follow to revolt, then the revolution would
fail and the first player will get nothing but a harsh punishment (e.g., physical penalty).
In this case, the qualitative property of the equilibrium will not change, there is still an
equilibrium with monotone strategy. The drawback is that the new model will become
untractable, and it’s more impossible to get analytical results of comparative statics and
welfare.
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Chapter 3
Topic-Factorized Ideal Point
Estimation Using Votes and Texts
3.1 Introduction
Estimating voters’ ideological positions is an important task, which can help us understand
and predict their voting or other social behavior. For example, once we know a voter is
relatively conservative, we can expect she is more likely to vote for a republican candidate in
a presidential general election or vote against a congressional bill that is very liberal. Ideal
point models that estimate legislators’ ideological positions have attracted studies from
political science (Poole and Rosenthal (1997); Heckman and Snyder (1997); Londregan
(1999); Clinton et al. (2004); Lauderdale and Clark (2014)) and computer science (Gerrish
and Blei (2011, 2012)).
Figure 3.1: Illustration of standard one-dimensional ideal point model for sample
Democrats (blue) and Republicans (red). B. Obama and R. Paul are highlighted.
In standard one-dimensional ideal point estimation models, a legislator is assigned
a global ideal point representing her ideological position based on her legislative voting
records. For example, in Figure 3.1 we can see the ideal points of B. Obama and R.
Paul estimated by a standard one-dimensional model based on their voting records when
they were senator and house representative, respectively. From the figure, it is quite clear
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of topic-factorized ideal point model for sample Democrats (blue)
and Republicans (red). B. Obama and R. Paul are highlighted.
that Obama is liberal and Paul is conservative. The figure can also help to explain why
Obama garnered support from some moderate republicans and conservatives during the
2008 election, and why Paul is regarded as one of the most conservative republicans in
congress.
However, one-dimensional ideal point could be rather coarse to capture the whole pic-
ture of ideology, as it is quite normal that people may have different positions on different
policy dimensions. For example, some people may be more liberal on economic issues while
more conservative on cultural issues. From Figure 3.2 we can see that the ideal points of
Obama and Paul are rather different across a wide range of policy issues. In particular, the
figure confirms the well-perceived notion that Paul is the most conservative on the role of
government on economy but not on social issues and foreign policy matters, especially as
an opponent of war.1 A recent study by Feldman and Johnston (2013) has shown that two
dimensions (economic and social ideology) are the minimum needed to account for domestic
policy preferences, and multi-dimensionality leads to a significant amount of heterogeneity
in the structure of ideology that must be modeled to fully understand the structure and de-
1Please see Table 3.2 for the meaning of each dimension in Figure 3.2.
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terminants of political attitudes. Noting this, researchers in political science have developed
several multi-dimensional ideal point models (Poole and Rosenthal (1997); Heckman and
Snyder (1997); Clinton et al. (2004)). An important weakness of these models is that they
don’t give the explicit meaning to different dimensions. For example, suppose that using a
two-dimensional model you find that R. Paul is relatively right in the first dimension while
relatively left in the second dimension, which is better than a one-dimensional model, but
the two-dimensional model does not tell you what issues the first and second dimensions
are about. You need extra expertise to help find the explicit meaning of these dimensions,
which becomes more difficult when you want to increase further the number of dimensions.
The purpose of this paper is to construct a unified model to estimate the ideal points of the
U.S. House representatives and senators on different policy issues, based on voting records
and bill texts contained in the roll call voting data from the 101st congress until now. The
text information will be utilized to make each dimension explicitly meaningful.
A recent study (Gerrish and Blei (2012)) has shown that by incorporating the separately
predetermined topic information of bills and modeling issue-adjusted ideal points for voters,
the model has a much higher explanation power of the voting behavior. However, in this
study, the topics (i.e., policy issues) are learned in advance, topic modeling and voting
behavior modeling are two separate steps; and since ideal points for all issues are adjusted
based on the same global point, the model puts constraints on how a voter can change
her positions over different issues. Lauderdale and Clark (2014) uses opinion texts from
the U.S. Supreme Court to discover the extent to which different issues were at stake
in different cases and then estimate justice preferences within each of those issues using
voting records. The same as Gerrish and Blei (2012), they model topics and voting behavior
separately. In this paper, we propose a novel topic-factorized ideal point estimation model
by utilizing the roll call voting data that contains: (1), voting records between voters
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and bills; and (2), text information in bills. The key idea is, on one hand, using text
information through topic modeling can help enhance voting behavior modeling and make
each dimension meaningful; on the other hand, using voting record can help us gain a better
understanding about the latent topics, therefore build a better latent topic distribution over
text, e.g., if a legislator votes “YEA” on two bills, the chance that the two bills are talking
about similar topics is higher than the chance that the two bills are talking about different
topics. Our approach enhances the issue-adjusted ideal point model in two-folds. First, we
model the ideal point of voters and bills for each topic directly which allows free change of
positions across different topics. Second, the generation of topics are guided by the voting
matrix in addition to the text information in bills. A unified probabilistic model that
combines voting behavior modeling and topic modeling is proposed. An iterative learning
algorithm is proposed to estimate the topic distribution as well as the topic-factorized ideal
points alternatively.
By comparing with the state-of-the-art ideal point models, our method has a much
better explanation power in terms of held-out predictive accuracy. Besides, case studies
show that the topic-factorized ideal points coincide with human intuition. Finally, we
illustrate how to use these topic-factorized ideal points to make voting predictions for
unseen bills. The main contributions of our method are the following: first, we propose a
novel topic-factorized ideal point model based on text-rich legislative voting network (see
Figure 3.3), which simultaneously identifies the topics as well as the ideal points of voters
and bills in a wide range of topics; second, an efficient algorithm is proposed to learn the
model, which alternatively updates the topic distribution of each bill and ideal point for
each voter and bill; third, the experiments are preformed on the real-world legislative roll
call data of the U.S. congress, the results show that our model is superior to the state-of-
the-art methods in several aspects.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the related
works. In Section 3.3 we introduce the preliminaries and formally define the problem. In
Section 3.4 we discuss our model in detail and introduce the estimation strategy. Section
3.5 describes the data, shows the empirical results and evaluates the model. We draw a
conclusion of the paper in Section 3.6.
3.2 Related work
Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991, 1997) make seminal contributions and launched a mas-
sive literature of ideal point models. Alternative methods of ideal point estimation are
developed by political scientists including Heckman and Snyder (1997), Londregan (1999)
and Clinton et al. (2004). In Gerrish and Blei (2012), an issue-adjusted ideal point model
is developed in order to identify a legislator’s position for each explicit topic from her vot-
ing behavior and text information in bills. Apart from a global position, legislators have
adjusted positions for different topics. They try to explain legislators’ voting behavior by
their affinity to topics that a bill covers. A network-based method is proposed to estimate
ideal points for Twitter users in Barbera´ (2013). The key idea is that Twitter users prefer
to follow politicians whose political positions are similar to theirs. People’s political posi-
tions are then inferred by who they follow in social network. Lauderdale and Clark (2014)
uses opinion texts from the US Supreme Court to discover different issues first and then
uses standard ideal point models to estimate justice positions on different issues.
Ideal point estimation model is closely related to recommendation tasks in computer
science. Given a user-item rating matrix, where the entry at ith row and jth column denotes
the rating score from user i to item j, the recommendation task is to predict the rating
score of items for users. Traditional recommendation algorithms include collaborative fil-
tering (Herlocker et al. (1999)) and latent factor models (Koren et al. (2009); Mnih and
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Salakhutdinov (2007)). In latent factor models, people try to explain ratings by character-
izing users and items to several latent topics. This idea is natural in that people usually
rate an item based on several aspects, and items also have the corresponding properties.
One of the most well known latent factor models is matrix factorization in Koren et al.
(2009). In a matrix factorization model, each user i is represented by a vector ui and item
by a vector vj in the K-dimensional latent space. The rating of user i to item j can be seen
as the inner-product of the user feature vector and the item feature vector: rˆij = uiv
T
j . It
naturally leads to the decomposition of the rating matrix R into the product of two ma-
trices R = UV T , where U is an N ×K user-factor matrix, and V is an M ×K item-factor
matrix. In this paper, we focus on the modeling of the voting prediction on a legislative
voting context, where legislators do not have full freedom to choose bills to vote. Also, we
want to include the text information to enhance the prediction accuracy.
Topic model is a type of statistic model for discovering the abstract topics that occur in
a collection of documents. In topic models, each document is represented as a bag of words.
The basic idea is, a latent topic is drawn conditionally to the document, and each word
is then generated from that topic. The standard topic models include PLSA (Hofmann
(1999)) and LDA (Blei et al. (2003)).
In addition to the text information in documents, the links between documents can be
exploited to further enhance the result of topic models. Sun et al. (2009) proposes a unified
information network-enhanced topic model that integrates the structural information and
text information in a document network, and Mei et al. (2008) proposes a solution to the
problem of topic modeling with network structure regularization. Both of the two studies
can significantly enhance the quality of standard topic models. In this paper, the topic
modeling part is enhanced by the voting link part, which is different from the two papers
where links exist between documents.
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Topic model can be used to enhance recommendation as well (Gerrish and Blei (2012);
Agarwal and Chen (2010); Wang et al. (2010)). A collaborative topic regression model is
proposed to recommend scientific articles (Wang and Blei (2011)). The recommendation
algorithm is based on both content of articles and users’ ratings, and topic distributions are
converted into feature vectors for users and items. Different from these methods, we use
topic distribution to find explicit policy dimensions for ideal points analysis, while existing
methods directly use topic distribution as feature vector for users and items. In McAuley
and Leskovec (2013), a topic model is built on the reviews from users to products to help
the rating prediction. The text information exists directly on the links from users to items,
while in our case, text information is only linked to bills.
3.3 Preliminary and problem definition
In this section, we introduce the legislative voting network in our problem setting, the
preliminaries related to ideal point model (IPM), and formally define our problem.
3.3.1 Legislative voting network
A text-rich legislative voting network can be extracted from roll call voting data, which is
comprised of three different types of objects: voters, bills, and words. Voters (u) and bills
(d) are linked together according to the voting behavior, and the weight of links (vud) is
either 1 (representing a “YEA” vote) or −1 (representing a “NAY” vote). Bills and words
are linked together if the word appears in the bill, and the weight is determined by the
number of occurrences of the word. An example of such legislative voting network that is
extracted from the US roll call voting data is shown in Figure 3.3. It is worth noting that
the value of vud between user u and bill d can also be 0, which means the link between u
and d is missing, i.e., not voting or absence. We do not model missing links in this paper.
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Figure 3.3: An illustration of legislative voting network.
3.3.2 Ideal point models
The goal of ideal point model is to estimate the policy positions of voters and bills that
can explain the voting or other social behavior. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) proposed a
seminal one-dimensional ideal point model for understanding legislative behavior. Poole
and Rosenthal (1997) studied a similar model in a higher-dimensional setting. Alternative
higher-dimensional ideal point models have been developed by Heckman and Snyder (1997),
Londregan (1999), and Clinton et al. (2004). We first briefly introduce one-dimensional and
higher-dimensional ideal point models, then the closely-related issue-adjusted ideal point
model by Gerrish and Blei (2012) that utilized text information in bills to make topics as
explicit dimensions.
One-dimensional ideal point model
In one-dimensional ideal point model, each legislator u is associated with an ideal point
xu, which represents her position. Each bill d has a polarity ad and a popularity offset bd
as well. The probability of voting “YEA” is given by p(vud = 1) = σ(xu · ad + bd), where
σ denotes the logistic or probit function. All the parameters are estimated by maximizing
the likelihood of observed voting matrix under this model.
Higher-dimensional ideal point model
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Due to the limitation that one-dimensional ideal point cannot capture the different
behavior of legislators for different topics, researchers extend the above model to higher
dimensions. Each voter and bill is mapped into a K-dimensional space, the probability of
a voter voting “YEA” for a bill is given by σ(xu ·ad+bd), where xu and ad are in the space
of RK and “ · ” denotes dot product.
Issue-adjusted ideal point model
The latent space derived in the higher-dimensional ideal point model, however, is very
difficult to interpret. Thus, an issue-adjusted ideal point model (Gerrish and Blei (2012))
is proposed very recently to estimate the adjusted ideal points on some separately prede-
termined issues. In this model, every legislator u has an adjusted issue preference vector
zu ∈ RK (K is the number of topics) beyond the global ideal point xu. The probabili-
ty of voting “YEA” is determined by her global ideal point as well as the adjusted ideal
point in each topic, weighted by the conditional expectation of a bill’s topic distribution:
p(vud = 1) = σ((z
T
uE[θd|wd] +xu)ad + bd), where θd is the topic distribution of a bill d and
wd is the observed word vector for bill d.
In this model, however, the topics are predetermined, and there is no impact from
voting records which in fact can effectively enhance the topic generation. For example, it’s
natural to think that if a legislator votes “YEA” for two bills, then there is a higher chance
that the two bills are talking about similar issues; similarly, if a legislator votes “NAY” for
two bills, then there is a higher chance that the two bills are talking about different issues.
So the voting records can help guide the topic generation. Besides, since ideal points for
all topics are adjusted based on the same global point, the model puts constraints on how
a voter can change her positions in different topics. We thus propose a new ideal point
model that can overcome the two limitations, and the problem is defined formally in the
following.
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3.3.3 Problem definition
Given a legislative voting network G, which contains NU voters, ND bills and NW terms,
and the number K of topics, our goal is to learn the topic models (Θ = {θd}NDd=1, β =
{βk}Kk=1) and estimate topic-factorized ideal points for voters (X = {xuk}) and bills (A =
{adk}), which can best explain the observed network. Here, we use xuk to denote the ideal
point of voter u in topic k, and adk to denote the ideal point of bill d in topic k.
The detailed topic-factorized ideal point model that can solve this problem is introduced
in next section, and all notations used can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Table of Notation
NU Total number of voters
ND Total number of bills
NW Total number of terms
NV Total number of votes
K Total number of topics
θd Topic distribution for bill d
βk Word distribution for topic k
xuk Ideal point for voter u in topic k
adk Ideal point for bill d in topic k
n(d,w) Frequency of word w appearing in bill d
vud Voting from voter u to bill d
bd Constant offset of bill d
V The observed voting matrix {vud}
W The observed document-word matrix {n(d,w)}
Θ The parameter matrix {θdk}
X The parameter matrix {xdk}
A The parameter matrix {adk}
3.4 Model and estimation
In this section, we first introduce the topic-factorized ideal point model (TF-IPM) in detail,
and then propose the estimation strategy that can learn the parameters in the model given
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the observed legislative voting network.
3.4.1 Topic-factorized ideal point model
The idea of our model is to build a probabilistic model for the legislative voting network,
which contains two parts: (1) the probability modeling for observing the whole corpus of
bills given the topic models, and (2) the probability modeling for the voting record given
the topic distribution of bills as well as the ideal points for bills and voters in each topic.
The goal is then to learn the parameters including the topic distributions and ideal points
that can maximize the combined likelihood function.
The topic-factorized ideal point model can be illustrated by a graphical model as shown
in Figure 3.4. We now introduce the two parts separately in the following.
Figure 3.4: Graphical illustration for topic-factorized ideal point model.
Modeling the text part
Following the idea of traditional topic models PLSA (Hofmann (1999)) and LDA (Blei
et al. (2003)), we can model the probability of each word in each document as a mixture
of multinomial distributions. Let n(d,w) be the frequency of term w appearing in bill d,
θdk = p(k|d) be the probability of document d belonging to topic k, and βkw = p(w|k) be
the probability that topic k generates word w, then the probability of word w appearing in
document d with n(d,w) occurrences can be defined as (
∑
k θdkβkw)
n(d,w). The probability
75
of observing the word count vector wd = (n(d, 1), n(d, 2), . . . , n(d,NW )) for document d
is then p(wd|Θ,β) =
∏
w(
∑
k θdkβkw)
n(d,w), and the probability of observing the whole
corpus is then:
p(W|Θ,β) =
∏
d
∏
w
(
∑
k
θdkβkw)
n(d,w) (3.1)
where W is the observed document-word count matrix.
Modeling voting links
Now we introduce how the voting links can be modeled. Intuitively, legislators (u)
are associated with different ideal points in different topics, which are represented using
a K-dimensional vector xu; and bills (d) are also associated with different ideal points if
they belong to different topics, which are represented using another K-dimensional vector
ad. For each vote from a user u to a bill d, the probability of whether the vote is a “YEA”
or “NAY” is determined by the ideal points for u and d in each topic. For example, if the
bill is a combination of “education” and “health care”, we need to see whether the ideal
points of u and d agree with each other in both topics.
Let vud be the vote score from voter u to bill d, we use vud = 1 to denote “YEA”, i.e., u
voted for d, and use vud = −1 to denote “NAY”, i.e., u voted against d. The probabilities
of the two values of vud are defined by:
p(vud = 1) = σ(
∑
k
θdkxukadk + bd)
p(vud = −1) = 1− σ(
∑
k
θdkxukadk + bd)
(3.2)
where θdk is the topic proportion for bill d in topic k, xuk denotes the ideal point of voter
u in topic k, adk denotes the ideal point of bill d in topic k, bd denotes the constant offset,
and σ denotes the logistic function. Since
∑
k θdk = 1, the summation
∑
k θdkxukadk can
be regarded as the weighted average of the agreement between legislator u and bill d in K
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topics. Note that, we only model the observed links from voters to bills, i.e., for the pairs
(u, v) that vud 6= 0. In other words, whether a voter u votes a bill d is not modeled, as in
reality most legislators cast their votes for almost all bills in their terms.
The overall likelihood of observed votes can be modeled as:
p(V|Θ,X,A,b) =
∏
(u,d):vud 6=0
(
p(vud = 1)
1+vud
2 p(vud = −1)
1−vud
2
)
(3.3)
where V is observed voting matrix, Θ,X,A,b are parameters in matrix/vector form for
topic distribution, ideal points of voters and bills, and constant offsets describing the
popularity of bills. 1+vud2 and
1−vud
2 transforms the original votes to 1 or 0, which plays a
role as an indicator function.
Unified model
We now combine the two parts together, and the final objective function is a linear
combination of the two average log likelihood functions over the word-document links and
voting links. In addition, we also add an l2 regularization term to X and A to reduce the
effect of over-fitting, equivalently by assuming they are from a Gaussian prior with mean
as 0, and standard deviation as σ:
J(θ,β,X,A,b) = (1− λ)
∑
d,w n(d,w) log (
∑
k θdkβkw)∑
d,w n(d,w)
+
λ
∑
(u,d):vud 6=0
(
1+vud
2 log p(vud = 1) +
1−vud
2 log p(vud = −1)
)
NV
− 1
2σ2
· (
∑
k
x2uk +
∑
k
a2dk)
(3.4)
s.t.
0 ≤ θdk ≤ 1,
∑
k
θdk = 1
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and
0 ≤ βkw ≤ 1,
∑
w
βkw = 1
where
∑
d,w n(d,w) denotes the total number of word occurrences in the bills, NV denotes
the total number of votes, and λ ∈ (0, 1) is the tradeoff weight over the two average
log-likelihood functions. The goal is now to find the best parameters Θ,β,X,A,b that
maximize the objective function 3.4.
Discussion about the model
The advantage of modeling Θ In issue-adjusted IPM, a pre-calculated Θ has been
used as an auxiliary parameter in the voting part. In practice, however, voting behaviors
can also help to guide the topics generation. From our experiments, we can see that the
held-out predictive accuracy can be significantly enhanced when topics are further adjusted
according to voting behaviors.
Topic model with background In Zhai et al. (2004), a background model is proposed
to help improve the PLSA model. This background model can detect topics that are more
distinctive. As there are many background words in the bills, we find that by including
a background model in the topic modeling part, the performance of our model can be
further enhanced. Considering to compare with issue-adjusted model more fairly, we do
not introduce the results in the experiment section.
Adding priors to TF-IPM In issue-adjusted IPM, priors are added on the param-
eters. For example, X is assumed from a Gaussian distribution. Similar priors are put
on the parameters of our model via the regularization term. In the experiment section,
in order to compare all the models fairly, we put the same regularization term for all the
baselines.
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3.4.2 The Estimation strategy
In this section, we introduce the learning algorithm to estimate the parameters, which is
an iterative algorithm containing two steps. In the first step, we update the ideal points
related parameters (X, A, and b) when topics related parameters (Θ and β) are fixed;
and in the second step, we update the topic models (Θ and β) when fixing ideal points
related parameters (X, A, and b).
The first step: updating X, A, b
We estimate X, A, b using gradient descent algorithm, which involves derivative cal-
culation in the objective function. They are updated using the following rule:
xuk = xuk + η
∂J
∂xuk
adk = adk + η
∂J
∂adk
bd = bd + η
∂J
∂bd
(3.5)
where η is the learning rate (we initialize η to be 10−5, and use line search strategy to
adjust η automatically), and
∂J
∂xuk
= λ
∑
d:vud 6=0 adkxuk
(
1+vud
2 − p(vud = 1)
)
NV
− xuk
σ2
∂J
∂adk
= λ
∑
u:vud 6=0 θdkxuk
(
1+vud
2 − p(vud = 1)
)
NV
− adk
σ2
∂J
∂bd
= λ
∑
u:vud 6=0
(
1+vud
2 − p(vud = 1)
)
NV
(3.6)
The second step: updating Θ and β
Since the summation of θ is inside log function, the derivative is not easy to compute.
Here we follow the idea of expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and maximize a lower
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bound of the original objective function. We have noted that
∑
d,w
n(d,w) log
(∑
k
θdkβkw
)
=
∑
d,w
n(d,w) log
(∑
k
p(k|d,w) θdkβkw
p(k|d,w)
)
≥
∑
d,w
n(d,w)
∑
k
p(k|d,w) log θdkβkw
p(k|d,w)
=
∑
d,w
n(d,w)
∑
k
p(k|d,w) log θdkβkw − c
(3.7)
where c =
∑
d,w n(d,w)
∑
k p(k|d,w) log p(k|d,w) is a constant with respect to θ and β.
The inequality holds because of the Jensen’s inequality of the concave function log(·). Now
we denote the lower bound of 3.4 as:
J1(Θ,β) = (1− λ)
∑
d,w n(d,w)
∑
k p(k|d,w) log θdkβkw∑
d,w n(d,w)
+
λ
∑
u,d
(
1+vud
2 log p(vud = 1) +
1−vud
2 log p(vud = −1)
)
NV
− 1
2σ2
· (
∑
k
x2uk +
∑
k
a2dk)
(3.8)
and we seek to maximize it w.r.t Θ and β.
Updating Θ given other parameters is a nonlinear constrained optimization problem.
We could use the method of Lagrange multipliers to remove the constraints, but it involves
to solve a complicated function of Lagrange multipliers. Here we use another method to
remove the constraints. We regard θdk as a function of a new set of parameters µdk such
that there are no constraints on µdk. We define the logistic function-based transformation
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as
θdk =

eµdk
1+
K−1∑
k′=1
eµdk′
if 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1
1
1+
K−1∑
k′=1
eµdk′
if k = K
(3.9)
The new set of parameters µdk(1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1) are real numbers and they have no
constraints, therefore we can update µdk using gradient descent and recover θdk using the
formula above.
The derivative w.r.t µdk is
∂J1
∂µdk
=
K∑
k′=1
∂J1
∂θdk′
∂θdk′
∂µdk
(3.10)
where
∂J1
∂θdk′
= (1− λ)
∑
w n(d,w)p(k
′|d,w)
θdk′
∑
d,w n(d,w)
+ λ
∑
u adk′xuk′
(
1+vud
2 − p(vud = 1)
)
NV
(3.11)
and
∂θdk′
∂µdk
=

θdk(1− θdk) if k′ = k
−θdk′θdk if k′ 6= k
(3.12)
We observe that β only appears in the topic model part. So we update β using the
EM algorithm as Hofmann (1999) proposed. The update rule of β is
βnewkw =
∑
d n(d,w)p(k|d,w)∑
d,w n(d,w)p(k|d,w)
(3.13)
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where
p(k|d,w) = θ
old
dk β
old
kw∑
k′ θ
old
dk′β
old
k′w
(3.14)
3.5 Empirical analysis
In this section, we show the empirical results of our model for the legislative voting network
extracted from the U.S. Congress (including the Senate and the House) roll call data.
3.5.1 Data description
We collect the U.S. House and Senate roll call data in the years between 1990 and 2013
from THOMAS2, a public website providing federal legislative voting information. Votes
and text information for bills are downloaded. We only select the bills where the text
information is available, and keep the latest version of a bill if there are multiple versions.
For each bill, we first remove stop words, and then choose 10,000 distinct words with
highest frequency as the dictionary. 1299 House representatives and 241 senators are
collected. Legislators from House have voted 6479 bills, while legislators from Senate have
voted 1247 bills. There are 564 bills that are voted by both House and Senate.
In total, there are 1540 legislators, 7162 bills, and 2780453 votes. Some interesting
statistics of the data set are shown in Figure 3.5 and 3.6.
3.5.2 Performance evaluation
We now compare our TF-IPM model with several baseline methods in different aspects to
demonstrate the power of the proposed model.
Baseline methods
We compare our methods with three baseline methods.
2http://thomas.loc.gov/home/rollcallvotes.html
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(a) House (b) Senate
Figure 3.5: Statistics of number of votes for legislators in House and Senate.
(a) House (b) Senate
Figure 3.6: Statistics of percentage of “YEA” for legislators in House and Senate.
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1. One-dimensional ideal point model described in Section 3.3.2, denoted as 1-IPM.
2. High-dimensional ideal point model described in Section 3.3.2, denoted as H-IPM.
3. Issue-adjusted ideal point model described in Section 3.3.2, denoted as IA-IPM.
We use the same number of K for H-IPM, IA-IPM, and TF-IPM, to make sure that the
dimensionality of idea points is the same.
Evaluation measures
In order to see whether our model has better explanation power of the legislative voting
network, we compare our model to others in terms of the following measures for both
training and testing dataset, where we randomly select 90% of the votes as training and
10% of the votes as testing.
• Root-mean-square error (RMSE) between the predicted vote score and the ground
truth vote score: RMSE =
√∑
(u,d):vud 6=0
(
1+vud
2
−p(vud=1)
)2
NV
.
• Accuracy of correctly predicted votes (using 0.5 as threshold for the predicted prob-
ability) among all the votes: Accuracy =
∑
(sgn(p(vud=1)−0.5)==vud)
NV
, where sgn is the
sign function.
• Average log-likelihood of the voting link:
AvglogL =
∑
(u,d):vud 6=0
(
1+vud
2
log p(vud=1)+
1−vud
2
log p(vud=−1)
)
NV
.
The regularization parameter σ is chosen to be 22.4 in all methods so as to make the
regularization coefficient 1
2σ2
around 0.001. λ is set to be 0.8 in TF-IPM.
From the Figure 3.7, we can see that high-dimensional IPM (H-IPM) has the best
explanation power over the training dataset in terms of all three measures, due to its
flexibility in choosing any possible latent factors. TF-IPM has the second best training
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(a) RMSE (b) Accuracy (c) Average log-
likelihood
Figure 3.7: Comparison on training data set.
accuracy. However, in Figure 3.8, we can see that: (1) TF-IPM can overcome the over-
fitting issue of H-IPM when the number of topics increases, e.g., when K = 20, TF-IPM
can beat all three baselines in all three measures; and (2) TF-IPM consistently has better
testing performance in terms of all three measures than the other two baselines for all
values of K. Considering the interpretability of topic-factorized ideal points, we can see
TF-IPM is a better choice.
Most of the models suffer from over-fitting problems when the number of topics increas-
es. We use 10 topics for parameter study and show convergence of our learning algorithm
as following.
Parameter study
In our model we have used the parameter λ that weights the likelihood of topic model
part and voting part as well as the regularization parameter σ. Intuitively, a larger λ means
we emphasize more on the voting part. We evaluate the effect of λ and show it in Figure
3.9. By varying the value of λ in the range of (0, 1), we can derive different parameter
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(a) RMSE (b) Accuracy (c) Average log-
likelihood
Figure 3.8: Comparison on testing data set.
estimations, and calculate the average log-likelihood and RMSE on testing data. From the
result, we can clearly see that voting part indeed plays a more important role than the
topic part, but when λ is too big, the performance of our model will become worse due to
over-fitting. We set λ = 0.8 in all other experiments.
We also study the effect of the regularization term on the performance of our model. We
try different values of σ and evaluate average log-likelihood and RMSE on testing dataset.
The results are shown in Figure 3.10, and we can see that the performance becomes less
sensitive when σ becomes larger. We set σ = 22.4 in all other experiments.
Convergence of our learning algorithm
In order to get a better idea of our iterative learning algorithm, we study the convergence
of the learning algorithm here. Figure 3.11 shows that our learning algorithm converges.
Along with the iterations, the objective function is increasing, while training and testing
errors are decreasing.
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(a) Average log-likelihood (b) RMSE
Figure 3.9: Parameter study on λ.
(a) Average log-likelihood (b) RMSE
Figure 3.10: Parameter study on σ.
3.5.3 Empirical results: case studies
We now show some case studies to demonstrate ideal points detected by our model. By
setting topic number K = 10 and λ = 0.8, we get topics as shown in Table 3.2 and ideal
points of legislators as shown in Figure 3.2. We also give topics as shown in Table 3.3
when setting K = 15 and λ = 0.8. It is not difficult to see that the topics are more
distinguishable for K = 15 than K = 10. We use K = 15 for the following case studies.
We study the voting behaviors for three legislators in the U.S. Congress: Barack Obama,
current president and previous Democratic Senator from Illinois (in office: 2005 - 2008);
Ronald Paul, Republican House representative from Texas (in office: 1976-1977, 1979-1985,
and 1997-2013); and Joe Lieberman, Democratic Senator from Connecticut (in office: 1989
- 2013). Their ideal points are shown in Figure 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14, respectively. We
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Table 3.2: Selected top words in each topic for K = 10
# Top words
1 Assistance, Public, Land, Development, Energy
2 Services, Educational, Expenses, School, Children
3 Individual, Person, Relating, Property
4 Institution, Education, Financial, Company, Bank
5 Military, Expense, Defense, Property
6 Law, Loan, Amounts, Expended
7 Health, Service, Care, Assistance
8 Health, Requirements, Payment, Individual
9 Individual, Law, Services, Expenses
10 Housing, Transportation, Construction, Military
Table 3.3: Selected top words in each topic for K = 15
# Top words
1 Education, Tax, Taxable, Budget, Children
2 Requirements, Water, Health, Regulations, Emissions
3 Expense, Military, Construction, Health, Security
4 Expense, Land, Exceed, Heading, Alien
5 Expense, Military, Remain, Budget, Defense, Operation
6 Health, Financial, Covered, Military, Insurance
7 Health, Research, Expenses, Care, Contract, Facility
8 Agency, Public, Housing, Land, Contract
9 Transportation, Expenses, Public, Projects, Health
10 Individual, Energy, Health, Research, Grant
11 Education, Children, Property, Child, School
12 Financial, Loan, Taxable, Property, Institution, Credit
13 Health, Care, Financial, Institution, Payment
14 Development, Energy, Agricultural, Transportation, Crop
15 Public, School, Education, Students, Technical
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(a) Objective Function (b) RMSE
Figure 3.11: Convergence Study
also show the ideal points of other legislators as background in order to understand their
relative positions and make the scale more meaningful. We can see that: (1), Obama
is in general in the middle and moderately left in almost all the policy dimensions; (2),
Paul is regarded as one of the most conservative republicans in congress, or as he calls
himself, “a constitutionalist” (never vote for a legislative bill unless the proposed measure
is expressly authorized by the Constitution), but is an opponent of military intervention;
and (3), Lieberman’s positions are rather mixed across different policy dimensions, he is
regarded as a democrat in many domestic policies like education and health, but moves
moderately right in foreign policy and military use.
We also select one famous bill, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, com-
monly called the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare”. It is a bill introduced in
2009 and signed into law by President Barack Obama in 2010. We can find the topic
distribution θdk as well as the positions adk of this bill in Figure 3.15. We can clearly see
that the top two topics the bill belongs to are health-related, with a combined probability
of 45 percent. We can also infer from the ideal points of Ronald Paul and the ideal points
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Figure 3.12: Estimated Ideal Points for Barack Obama
Figure 3.13: Estimated Ideal Points for Ronald Paul
of this bill that R.Paul should have voted against this bill.
In addition, we select three topics, topic 6 (labeled as “Health”), topic 9 (labeled as
“Public Projects”) and topic 15 (labeled as “Public Education”), and draw scatter plots
for all the legislators in every two of these three topics. Democratic people are represented
90
Figure 3.14: Estimated Ideal Points for Joe Lieberman
(a) Topic Distributions (b) Bill Positions
Figure 3.15: Bill H.R.3590, “Obamacare”
as blue dots, while Republican people are represented as red ones. We can see clearly
from Figure 3.16, 3.17 and 3.18 that legislators in different parties lie on different sides of
each plane. It can also be seen that, by such analysis it is easy to figure out how the two
parties differentiate with each other on different policy issues. For example, Democratic
and Republican seem rather different on health and public project issues, but not on public
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education. Besides, such analysis can easily tell us how close two legislators are in terms
of certain topic dimensions. We can also easily detect outliers from the visualization. A
dynamic analysis, e.g., if we get the scatter plots for different sessions of the House and
Senate, we will be able to see that how the legislators diverge or converge on different
policy dimensions over the time.
Figure 3.16: Scatter plot between “health” and “public projects”.
3.5.4 Predicting votes for unseen bills
An interesting application of our model is to make voting predictions for an unseen bill d
with just text information. Note that, for 1-IPM and H-IPM, there is no way for us to
predict votes related to an unseen bill, as it is impossible to get the latent feature for an
unseen bill.
We perform our study in the following three steps:
• First, we estimate the topic distribution for the bill θd according to current topic
models, i.e., the β, using simple language models.
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Figure 3.17: Scatter plot between “health” and “public education”.
Figure 3.18: Scatter plot between “public projects” and “public education”.
• Second, we train a linear regression model to predict ad and bd, utilizing the text in-
formation (bag-of-word representation) as features. Note that, once we have learned
the ideal points and popularity for the observed bills, we can then use these bills as
training samples to learn the weights associated with the linear model. Using text to
analyze data actually belongs to a broader study of opinion mining ( Pang and Lee
(2008)). Here, we just use a simple approach to demonstrate our TF-IPM model.
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• Finally for each legislator u, we can predict whether she favors this unseen bill by
plugging in her ideal points in each topic: p(vud = 1) = σ(
∑
k θdkxukadk + bd).
We find that by using 90% of the bills as training dataset and hide all the voting
information for the remaining 10% bills as testing dataset, we can still achieve a 80.8%
accuracy in predicting votes from voters to them. More studies along this line will be
performed in future work.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel topic-factorized ideal point estimation model (TF-IPM)
that utilizes text information of bills and voting records collectively in a legislative voting
network extracted from the U.S. Congress roll call voting data. We model the ideal points of
legislators and bills for multiple policy dimensions instead of assigning them to a global one.
Besides, using the topic information contained in the bill texts, we make each dimension
meaningful, while in the higher-dimensional ideal point models in the literature, the latent
policy space is difficult to interpret. An important innovation of our model is that, the
generation of topics are guided by the voting matrix in addition to the text information
contained in bills.
A unified model that combines voting behavior modeling and topic modeling is pre-
sented, and an iterative estimation strategy is proposed to learn the topics of bills as well
as the topic-factorized ideal points of legislators and bills. By comparing with the state-
of-the-art ideal point estimation models, our method has a much better explanation power
in terms of held-out log-likelihood and other measures. In addition, case studies show that
the topic-factorized ideal points coincide with human intuition. Finally, we illustrate how
to use these topic-factorized ideal points to predict voting results for unseen bills.
Predicting voting results for unseen bills is an important task which is worth further
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studying. Another possible extension is to add user guidance for the topic modeling part.
In this regard, a user can identify the topics that she has interest and give a bag of top
words associated with those topics; or a user can manually choose a small set of bills and
classify the bills into different topics. By doing this, a user may find the positions of
legislators on those dimensions that she cares about but might be ignored by the model
presented here because of small number of occurrences in all the bills.
95
Appendix A
Proofs
Lemma A.1. For any pair of policy platform (t0, t1), define the set of voters who (weakly)
prefer candidate j as S = {θ | uθ(cj , xj0, xj1) ≥ uθ(c−j , x−j0 , x−j1 )}, then either we have
S = [0, 1], or S is an interval with 0 or 1 as one endpoint and the other endpoint θ¯ ∈ (0, 1),
where θ¯ is the cut-off voter type who is indifferent between the two candidates.
Proof. Given any pair (t0, t1), for a voter θ, her utility from candidate j is:
uθ(c
j , xj0, x
j
1) = 1− tj + θv0(αjtj) + (1− θ)v1((1− αj)tj); (A.1)
her utility from candidate −j is:
uθ(c
−j , x−j0 , x
−j
1 ) = 1− t−j + θv0(α−jt−j) + (1− θ)v1((1− α−j)t−j). (A.2)
θ is indifferent between the two candidates if and only if A.1=A.2, that is:
θ[v0(α
jtj)− v0(α−jt−j) + v1((1− α−j)t−j)− v1((1− αj)tj)]
= tj − t−j + v1((1− α−j)t−j)− v1((1− αj)tj).
(A.3)
Now if v0(α
jtj) − v0(α−jt−j) + v1((1 − α−j)t−j) − v1((1 − αj)tj) = 0, then S = [0, 1]; if
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v0(α
jtj)−v0(α−jt−j) +v1((1−α−j)t−j)−v1((1−αj)tj) 6= 0, from Equation A.3 we have:
θ =
tj − t−j + v1((1− α−j)t−j)− v1((1− αj)tj)
v0(αjtj)− v0(α−jt−j) + v1((1− α−j)t−j)− v1((1− αj)tj) . (A.4)
If the ratio of right hand side is ≤ 0 or ≥ 1, then we have S = [0, 1]; otherwise we
get the cut-off voter type θ¯ who is indifferent between the two candidates given (t0, t1).
Then if v0(α
jtj)− v0(α−jt−j) + v1((1− α−j)t−j)− v1((1− αj)tj) is positive, then we have
S = [θ¯, 1], if v0(α
jtj)− v0(α−jt−j) + v1((1− α−j)t−j)− v1((1− αj)tj) is negative, we have
S = [0, θ¯].
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Since v(x0, x1, θ) is a homothetic function, we have v(x0, x1, θ) =
g ◦ f , where g is a strictly increasing function and f(x0, x1, θ) is a homogeneous function
of degree k. Given tax rate t, a voter’s utility function can be written as:
uθ(c, x0, x1) = 1− t+ v(αt, (1− α)t, θ)
= 1− t+ g ◦ f(αt, (1− α)t, θ)
= 1− t+ g ◦ tkf(α, 1− α, θ).
(A.5)
For v(x0, x1, θ) satisfying the Mirrlees-Spence Condition (i.e.,
∂
∂θ [
∂v(x0,x1,θ)
∂x0
∂v(x0,x1,θ)
∂x1
] > 0, which
is automatically satisfied for our separable utility function v(x0, x1, θ)), f(α, 1− α, θ) also
satisfies, so there exists a voter type θ¯ such that f(α0, 1−α0, θ¯) = f(α1, 1−α1, θ¯). Then if
candidate 0 and candidate 1 propose any but the same tax rate t, θ¯ is indifferent between
the two candidates, for any voter θ > θ¯, she will vote for candidate 0, for any voter θ < θ¯,
she will vote for candidate 1. Because v(x0, x1, θ¯) is strictly increasing and strictly concave,
there is a unique t¯ maximizing voter θ¯’s utility, so Equation 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 can be satisfied
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with the tuple (t¯, θ¯).1
We now show that for homothetic v(x0, x1, θ), there cannot exist a Nash equilibrium
with a three-tuple (tˆ0, tˆ1, θˆ), where tˆ0 6= tˆ1. Suppose on the contrary that such a Nash
equilibrium exists, then we must have θˆ 6= θ¯, because t¯ is the unique optimal tax rate for
the type θ¯. Then compared with the winning probabilities in the equilibrium with (t¯, θ¯),
at least one candidate’s probability of winning strictly decreases, so at least one candidate
can strictly increase his winning probability by simply copying his opponent’s tax policy.
Because as long as the two candidates propose the same tax rate, the cut-off voter will
be θ¯, either candidate 0 or candidate 1 will increase his winning probability by a strictly
positive amount. We conclude that we cannot have an equilibrium with (tˆ0, tˆ1, θˆ), where
tˆ0 6= tˆ1. Now it’s also clear that (t¯, θ¯) is the unique solution of the system of equations.
Since we assume α0 > α1, so (1−α0) < (1−α1), thus when the two candidates propose
the same tax rate, we have x00 = α
0t¯ > x10 = α
1t¯, and x01 = (1− α0)t¯ < x11 = (1− α1)t¯. In
this case, the cut-off voter type can be easily got by Equation A.4:
θ¯ =
v1(x
1
1)− v1(x01)
v0(x00)− v0(x10) + v1(x11)− v1(x01)
. (A.6)
Now we show that (t¯, θ¯) is at least a local equilibrium. It’s easy to see that in Equation
1.2, both numerator and denominator in the right hand side are strictly positive. By
continuity, for a small change of tax rate, we still have x00 > x
1
0, and x
0
1 < x
1
1. So for a
small change of t¯0, candidate 0 will lose the support from the cut-off voter θ¯, the new cut-
off voter type will be greater than θ¯, and candidate 0 still get support from higher types,
so the set of voters who support candidate 0 will become smaller than before; similarly,
for a small change of t¯1, candidate 1 will lose the support from θ¯ and the set of voters
1More rigorously, we may require that for all θ ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1), the first derivative of v(x0, x1, θ)
with respect to the tax rate is +∞ at t = 0, and is < 1 at t = 1, to guarantee an inner solution t¯j ∈ (0, 1)
in equilibrium.
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who support him will also become smaller. So (t¯, θ¯) is a local equilibrium. Since (t¯, θ¯) is
the unique solution of the system of equations, if a global equilibrium exists, it must be
(t¯, θ¯).
Proof of Proposition 1.3. We first argue that we cannot have t¯0 = t¯1 in equilibrium. Sup-
pose on the contrary that such equilibrium exists and both candidates propose the same
tax rate t¯, according to Equation 1.3 and 1.4, we have:
∂v(x00,x
0
1,θ¯)
∂x00
α0 +
∂v(x00,x
0
1,θ¯)
∂x01
(1−α0) =
∂v(x10,x
1
1,θ¯)
∂x10
α1 +
∂v(x10,x
1
1,θ¯)
∂x11
(1 − α1), which is equivalent to: ∂vθ¯(α0,t)∂t = ∂vθ¯(α
1,t)
∂t , all deriva-
tives are evaluated at t¯. According to Equation 1.5, we have: vθ¯(α
0, t¯) = vθ¯(α
1, t¯). From
strict single-crossing property, we know that for any t > t¯, we have vθ¯(α
0, t) > vθ¯(α
1, t),
so the derivatives of vθ¯(α
0, t) and vθ¯(α
1, t) with respect to t must be different at t¯, which
contradicts with
∂vθ¯(α
0,t)
∂t =
∂vθ¯(α
1,t)
∂t , so we conclude that t¯
0 6= t¯1.
Now we show that t¯0 > t¯1. Because of strict concavity, t¯0 is the unique tax rate that
candidate 0 can choose to maximize voter θ¯’s utility, so we have: 1 − t¯1 + v(α0t¯1, (1 −
α0)t¯1, θ¯) < 1− t¯0 +v(α0t¯0, (1−α0)t¯0, θ¯), similarly, we have: 1− t¯0 +v(α1t¯0, (1−α1)t¯0, θ¯) <
1−t¯1+v(α1t¯1, (1−α1)t¯1, θ¯). But, 1−t¯0+v(α0t¯0, (1−α0)t¯0, θ¯) = 1−t¯1+v(α1t¯1, (1−α1)t¯1, θ¯),
since θ¯ is the cut-off voter type, so we have: 1−t¯1+v(α0t¯1, (1−α0)t¯1, θ¯) < 1−t¯1+v(α1t¯1, (1−
α1)t¯1, θ¯), and, 1− t¯0 + v(α1t¯0, (1− α1)t¯0, θ¯) < 1− t¯0 + v(α0t¯0, (1− α0)t¯0, θ¯). Simplifying,
we have vθ¯(α
0, t¯1) < vθ¯(α
1, t¯1), and, vθ¯(α
1, t¯0) < vθ¯(α
0, t¯0). Suppose t¯0 < t¯1, then these
two equations contradict with the strict single-crossing property, because the direction of
the inequality should not change from a lower tax rate t¯0 to a higher tax rate t¯1.
Because t¯0 > t¯1, we have x00 > x
1
0, candidate 0 offers more amount of good 0. Now
write a voter’s utility function as 1−x0−x1 + θv0(x0) + (1− θ)v1(x1). Because v(x0, x1, θ)
is separable between x0 and x1, we have
∂u(·)
∂x01
= ∂v(·)
∂x01
− 1, and ∂u(·)
∂x11
= ∂v(·)
∂x11
− 1, since
∂u(·)
∂x01
> 0 > ∂u(·)
∂x11
(see the right panel of Figure 1.3), we have ∂v(·)
∂x01
> 1 > ∂v(·)
∂x11
. And because
v(·) is strictly concave, we have x01 < x11, that is, candidate 0 offers less amount of good 1
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than candidate 1.
In this case, the cut-off voter type would be:
θ¯ =
t¯0 − t¯1 + v1(x11)− v1(x01)
v0(x00)− v0(x10) + v1(x11)− v1(x01)
. (A.7)
Since x00 > x
1
0 and x
1
1 > x
0
1, the denominator of Equation A.7 is positive. Using similar
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1.2, we can show that (t¯0, t¯1, θ¯) is a local equilib-
rium. For any voter with θ > θ¯, she will vote for candidate 0, for any voter with θ < θ¯,
she will vote for candidate 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.1. We prove by backward induction. Suppose we are in the last period
T , first assume that player j has already invested in some period t ≤ T − 1 and i has
not invested yet, we write ht(i, j) to denote the action profile up to period t, e.g., ht(0, 1)
means that i has not invested but j has already invested before period t. In this case, i
will invest in T if and only if:
E[(1− ρ)θ | xi, xj > kht(0,0)j ] > 0 (A.8)
From Lemma A.2 below, we know that there is an unique k
hT (0,1)
i < 0 such that if xi >
k
hT (0,1)
i , then Inequality A.8 holds. Now suppose that j has not invested before T , then i
will invest if and only if:
[1− Φ(k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)]E[12θ | xi, xj > k
hT (0,0)
j ] + Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)E[ρθ − µ | xi, xj ≤ khT (0,0)j ]
= 12 [1− Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)]xi + Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)xi −
√
2
4 σφ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)− µΦ(k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)
= 12xi +
1
2Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)xi − µΦ(k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)−
√
2
4 σφ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
) > 0
(A.9)
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Divide both sides by Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
), we have:
1
2
xi
Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)
+
1
2
xi − µ−
√
2
4
σ
φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k
hT (0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)
> 0 (A.10)
It’s clear that for any xi ≤ 0, the left hand side is smaller than zero. According to Lemma
A.2, the left hand side of A.10 is increasing in xi, so there is an unique k
hT (0,0)
i > 0 such
that if xi > k
hT (0,0)
i , the left hand side of A.10 is greater than zero, the Inequality A.10
holds. And we also get k
hT (0,0)
i > k
hT (0,1)
i , for j, we have k
hT (0,0)
j > k
hT (1,0)
j .
Now we go back to period T − 1. Assume again that j has not invested before T − 1,
then i’s expected payoff from investing is:
[1− Φ(k
hT−1(0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)]E[12θ | xi, xj > k
hT−1(0,0)
j ] + Φ(
k
hT−1(0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)E[ρθ | xi, xj ≤ khT−1(0,0)j ]
− µΦ(min{k
hT−1(0,0)
j ,k
hT (1,0)
j }−xi√
2σ
).
(A.11)
Assuming xi > k
hT (0,0)
i > k
hT (0,1)
i , if i does not invest in period T − 1, then i will invest in
period T anyway, so i’s expected payoff from not investing in T − 1 is no more than:
[1− Φ(k
hT−1(0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)]E[(1− ρ)θ | xi, xj > khT−1(0,0)j ] + Φ(
k
hT−1(0,0)
j −xi√
2σ
)
E[ρθ | xi, xj ≤ khT−1(0,0)j ] − µΦ(
min{khT−1(0,0)j ,k
hT (0,0)
j }−xi√
2σ
).
(A.12)
Since ρ ≥ 12 and k
hT (0,0)
j > k
hT (1,0)
j , it’s not difficult to see that A.11≥A.12. So, if in
period T − 1 player i observes that nobody has invested in the project, then it would be
more beneficial for i to invest in period T − 1 if he will invest in period T anyway, that is,
k
hT (0,0)
i ≥ khT−1(0,0)i . Repeat the analysis, we can conclude the lemma.
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Proof of Lemma 2.2. Follow the procedure in the proof of Lemma 2.1, suppose we are in
period T − 1, assume further that j has already invested in some period t ≤ T − 2, which
is observed by player i. Then i’s expected payoff from investing is:
E[(1− ρ)θ | xi, xj > kht(0,0)j ]. (A.13)
If i does not invest in T − 1 but wait until period T − 1, he will still get the same utility
as in A.13 if he invests, and he will get nothing if he does not invest. Note that he will
invest in T if and only if A.13 > 0, but in that case it is also worth to invest in period
T − 1, without loss of generality, we can just assume that a player invests early if there is
no difference between investing now and delay.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We first establish two lemmas which will be used in the proof.
Lemma A.2. Both E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] and E[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ] are increasing in xi, and there
is an unique solution (< 0) for E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] = 0, also there is an unique solution
(> 0) for E[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ] = 0.
Proof. Recall that E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] = xi +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
, note that the second part
of right hand is decreasing in xi because Φ is log-concave, so we need to show that the
deceasing rate is greater than −1.
Let δ(xi, k
1
j ) =
√
2σ
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
, because Φ is log-concave, the mean-advantage-over-inferiors
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function of k1j :
k1j −
∫ k1j
−∞ t
1√
2σ
φ(
t−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
dt
= k1j − (xi −
√
2σ
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
)
= k1j − (xi −
√
2σ
φ(
xi−k1j√
2σ
)
1−Φ(xi−k
1
j√
2σ
)
)
= k1j + δ(k
1
j , xi)− xi,
(A.14)
is increasing.2 This means δ′
k1j
(k1j , xi) ≥ −1, so we have δ′xi(xi, k1j ) = δ′k1j (k
1
j , xi) ≥ −1.
Then we can get E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] is increasing in xi. Note that as xi goes to negative
infinity, E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] goes to negative infinity, for xi = 0, E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] > 0, so
there is an unique solution (< 0) for E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] = 0. The proof for E[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ]
is analogous and thus omitted.
Lemma A.3. The ratio
Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
is (strictly) decreasing in xi.
Proof. The derivative with respect to xi is:
φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
) −1√
2σ
Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
) + Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
) 1√
2σ
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ2(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
(A.15)
Because Φ is log-concave, we have:
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ(xi−k
1
j√
2σ
)
<
φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ(xi−k
2
j√
2σ
)
⇔ φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
<
φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k2
j
−xi√
2σ
)
,
(A.16)
so we get A.15 is negative.
2Please refer to Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for applications of log-concave probabilities.
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We now prove the Proposition by backward induction. Given (k1j , k
2
j ), suppose now
player i is in the second period and has not chosen “1” in the first period. We’ve argued
that if cj,1 = 0, then ci,2 = 0; if cj,1 = 1, then player i’s expected net payoff from choosing
“1” is:
(1− ρ)E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] = (1− ρ)(xi +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1− Φ(k
1
j−xi√
2σ
)
) (A.17)
From Equation A.17 it’s clear that as xi → −∞, A.17 is negative, and for any xi ≥ 0, A.17
is positive, then from Lemma A.2 there is an unique k2i < 0 such that if xi > k
2
i , we have
(1− ρ)(k2i +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−k2i√
2σ
)
1− Φ(k
1
j−k2i√
2σ
)
) > 0 (A.18)
Now suppose player i is in the first period, obviously for xi ≤ k2i , he will not choose
“1” in the first period. So given xi > k
2
i , if he chooses “0” in the first period, then the
expected payoff is:
[1− Φ(k
1
j − xi√
2σ
)](1− ρ)E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ]; (A.19)
the expected payoff from choosing “1” is:
[1− Φ(k
1
j−xi√
2σ
)]E[12θ | xi, xj > k1j ] + [Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)− Φ(k
2
j−xi√
2σ
)]E[ρθ | xi, k1j ≥ xj > k2j ]
+Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)E[ρθ − µ | xi, xj ≤ k2j ].
(A.20)
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So the net payoff from “1”, equal to A.20−A.19, is:
[1− Φ(k
1
j−xi√
2σ
)]E[(ρ− 12)θ | xi, xj > k1j ] + [Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)− Φ(k
2
j−xi√
2σ
)]E[ρθ | xi, k1j ≥ xj > k1j ]
+Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)E[ρθ − µ | xi, xj ≤ k2j ]
= ρxi − µΦ(k
2
j−xi√
2σ
)− 12 [1− Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)]E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ]
= ρΦ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)E[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ]− µΦ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
) + (ρ− 12)[1− Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)]E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ]
(A.21)
At A.21 = 0, we have:
ρE[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ] =
µΦ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
− (ρ− 1
2
)[
1
Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
− 1]E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ] (A.22)
For the left hand side, ρE[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ] = ρ(xi −
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
), is increasing in xi for the
same reason as A.17; the second part of the right side, −(ρ− 12)[ 1
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
−1]E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ]
is decreasing in xi. By Lemma A.3,
Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
)
Φ(
k1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
is decreasing. So Equation A.22 has a unique
root k1i , such that if xi > k
1
i , then A.21 > 0.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. As k1j → −∞ (so is k2j ), we have Φ(
k2j−xi√
2σ
) → 0, Φ(k
1
j−xi√
2σ
) → 0,
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)→ 0, so Equation 2.8 becomes (ρ− 12)xi, which is ≥ 0 if and only if xi ≥ 0. The
cases for k2j = ∞ (so is k1j ) and k1j = ∞, k2j = −∞ are similar. If k1j = ∞, k2j ∈ R, then
Equation 2.8 = ρxi − µΦ(k
2
j−xi√
2σ
), which is strictly increasing in xi, so there is a unique
k1i > 0 such that if and only if xi > k
1
i , 2.8 > 0. If k
1
j ∈ R, k2j = −∞, then we can get an
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equation analogous to Equation A.22 from Equation 2.8:
ρE[θ | xi, xj ≤ k1j ] = −(ρ−
1
2
)[
1
Φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
− 1]E[θ | xi, xj > k1j ], (A.23)
the left hand side is strictly increasing in xi, the right hand side is strictly decreasing in
xi, so we have a unique k
1
i ∈ R solving the equation. Together with Equation A.18, we get
pair of payoff (k1i , k
2
i ) ∈ R×R as claimed.
Proof of Corollary 2.3. Let ϕ1(xi, k
1
j ) = (1 − ρ)(xi +
√
2σ
2
φ(
k1j−xi√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k
1
j
−xi√
2σ
)
)(see Equation A.17),
suppose ϕ1(k2i , k
1
j ) = 0, by log-concavity, ϕ
1 is strictly increasing in k1j , from Lemma A.2 we
know ϕ1 is strictly increasing in xi, so by Implicit Function Theorem, we can get
∂k2i
∂k1j
< 0.
From Equation 2.10, we can see that ϕ2 is decreasing in k2j , at an interval around k
1
i such
that ϕ2(k1i , k
1
j , k
2
j ) = 0, we have
∂ϕ2
∂k1i
> 0, then by employing Implicit Function Theorem
again, we have
∂k1i
∂k2j
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Define ϕ1(k1, k2) = k2 +
√
2σ
2
φ( k
1−k2√
2σ
)
1−Φ( k1−k2√
2σ
)
, at ϕ1(k1, k2) = 0, by
Implicit Function Theorem,
k2′(k1) = −ϕ
1′
k1(k
1, k2)
ϕ1′
k2
(k1, k2)
. (A.24)
Because of log-concavity of Φ, ϕ1′k1(k
1, k2) > 0. From Lemma A.2 we know that ϕ1′k2(k
1, k2) >
0, so the Equation A.24 is negative, we get k2 is monotone decreasing in k1.
Define ϕ2(k1, k2) = (ρ− 14)k1−µΦ(k
2−k1√
2σ
)−
√
2
4 σφ(0), at ϕ
2(k1, k2) = 0, apply Implicit
Function Theorem again, we get:
k1′(µ) = − ϕ
2′
µ (k
1, k2)
ϕ2′
k1
(k1, k2)
. (A.25)
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Note that ϕ2′µ (k1, k2) = −Φ(k
2−k1√
2σ
) < 0, ϕ2′k1(k
1, k2) = (ρ− 14)−µφ(k
2−k1√
2σ
) 1√
2σ
(k2′(k1)−1) >
0 because ρ− 14 > 0 and k2′(k1) < 0. Finally, we have k1′(µ) > 0, k2′(µ) = k2′(k1)k1′(µ) <
0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. At ϕ2(k1, k2) = 0, k1′(ρ) = − ϕ2′ρ (k1,k2)
ϕ2′
k1
(k1,k2)
, it’s obvious that ϕ2′ρ (k1, k2) =
k1 > 0 for any k1 in equilibrium, together with the argument that ϕ2′k1(k
1, k2) > 0 in the
previous proof, we have k1′(ρ) < 0, k2′(ρ) = k2′(k1)k1′(ρ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. By L’Hopital’s rule,
lim
σ→0
φ(k
1−k2√
2σ
)
1− Φ(k1−k2√
2σ
)
= lim
σ→0
φ(k
1−k2√
2σ
) · −12 · 2k
1−k2√
2σ
· k1−k2√
2
· −σ−2
φ(k
1−k2√
2σ
) · k1−k2√
2
· −σ−2 = limσ→0
k1 − k2√
2σ
. (A.26)
So as σ → 0, Equation 2.12 becomes: k1+k22 = 0; together with Equation 2.13, we can see
that as σ → 0, k1 → 0+, k2 → 0−.
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